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THE MYTH OF COPYRIGHT'S FAIR USE 
DOCTRINE AS A PROTECTOR OF FREE SPEECH 
Lee Ann W. Lockridget 
Abstract 
This article debunks the myth that the fair use doctrine exists to 
protect the freedom of speech within copyright. Using the history of 
fair use in the courts and in Congress, as well as recent case law, the 
Article demonstrates that.fair use is not, and never has been, intended 
or designed to restrain copyright in the face of the First Amendment. 
The conflict between copyright and free speech could be lessened by 
reforming the balance of interests within fair use to eliminate the 
focus on commercial use and to expand the understanding of the 
broader public-benefit purpose underlying the Supreme Court's 
analysis of transformative uses. This broadening of what constitutes a 
"fair" purpose and character of a use would create an opportunity 
for judicial balancing of the interests promoted by both copyright and 
the First Amendment. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court stated in Eldred v. Ashcroft that copyright 
stands apart from most speech restrictions with respect to First 
Amendment scrutiny due, in part, to copyright's promotion of speech 
through the creation and publication of expression.' The Supreme 
Court has also told us on more than one occasion that copyright 
includes built-in safeguards protecting the First Amendment freedom 
of expression, namely the fair use defense and the distinction between 
idea and expression.2 We are told that these two accommodations arc 
"generally adequate to address" First Amendment concerns, although 
they do not go so far as to make copyright "categorically immune" 
from a First Amendment challenge:3 "[W]hen, as in this case, 
Congress has not altered the traditional contours of copyright 
protection, further First Amendment scrutiny is unnecessary. "4 As 
Justice Breyer noted in his dissent in Eldred, the Court in that 
sentence provides questions, not answers.5 What are the "traditional 
contours" of copyright, and have they been altered? If the 
interpretation of the First Amendment matures in some way, should 
that not rightfully reopen the question of the interaction between 
copyright and free speech? And to the extent that the "traditional 
contours" of copyright have changed, will the Court actually be 
willing to scrutinize the relationship of copyright and free speech? 
In this article, I focus upon the fair use defense as an asserted 
safeguard of the freedom of speech guaranteed by the First 
Amendment, leaving to one side the idea-expression dichotomy, the 
I .  See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003) (citing Harper & Row. Publishers. 
Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985)) . 
. 2. See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 221; Hmper & Row, 471 U.S. at 560. See also Nihon Keizai 
S�1mbun, 
.
Inc. v. Comline Bus. Data, Inc., 166 F.3d 65, 74 (2d Cir. 1999) ("We have repeatedly 
rejected Ftrst Amendment challenges to injunctions from copyright infringement on the ground 
that First Amendment concerns are protected by and coextensive with the fair use doctrine."). 
3. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 221. 
4. Id 
5. As stated by Justice Breyer: 
':!e cannot avoid the need to exa
.
mine the statute carefully by saying that 
Congress has �ot altered the trad1t1onal contours of copyright protection," for 
the senten�e P?mts to the question, rather than the answer. Nor should we avoid 
that ex�mmat10n here. That degree of judicial vigilance-at the far outer 
boundanes of t�e Clause-is warranted if we are to avoid the monopolies and consequent restnct1ons of expression that the Clause, read consistently with the First Amendment, seeks to preclude. 
Id. at 264 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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other safeguard heralded by the Court.6 Following a brief survey of 
some basic principles underlying copyright and First Amendment 
protection and the manner in which the First Amendment can restrain 
copyright, I explore the question of whether the fair use doctrine was 
intended or designed to perform that function of restraint. The answer 
to that question is no. Despite the Court's assertion that the fair use 
doctrine safeguards the freedom of speech within the realm of 
copyright, I find that under modem First Amendment jurisprudence 
the structure and current interpretation of fair use miss the mark. 7 As 
codified in section 107 of the Copyright Act, the fair use doctrine 
directs courts to consider a matter that would be an improper 
consideration m any other First-Amendment-sensitive analysis, 
6. Other scholars have begun the critique of relying heavily on the modem distinction 
between ideas and expression to protect First Amendment rights. See, e.g., Neil W. Netanel, 
locating Copyright Within the First Amendment Skein, 54 STAN. L. REV. I, 13-20 (2001); 
Alfred C. Yen, A First Amendment Perspective on the Idea/Expression Dichotomy and 
Copyright in a Work's "Total Concept and Feel," 38 EMORY L.J. 393, 394-95 ( 1989). Further 
exploration of the topic in a manner parallel to the thesis I advance here would appropriately be 
the subject for an entirely separate article. 
I also leave to one side the important debate on the sufficiency of modem fair use's 
performance of its internal copyright duty of maintaining an appropriate balance between new 
creativity and existing creativity mindful of copyright's Constitutional goal of promoting the 
public interest through encouraging the production of new creative works. Similarly, I do not 
discuss the arguable economic role of fair use as a means of addressing market failure. See, e.g., 
Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of the 
Betamax Case and its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600 (1982). Instead, I limit my 
discussion and analysis here to the interaction of fair use with the First Amendment. 
The work of many scholars enables me to move quickly through the initial question 
of the interaction of copyright with the First Amendment and to focus instead on the specific 
question of fair use. Among those scholars and their relevant works are: Paul Goldstein, 
Copyright and the First Amendment, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 983 (1970); David McGowan, Why the 
First Amendment Cannot Dictate Copyright Policy, 65 U. PITT . L. REV. 281 (2004); Netanel, 
supra; Melville 8. Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the First Amendment Guarantees of Free 
Speech and Press?, I 7 UCLA L. REV. 1180 (1970); Jed Rubenfeld, The Freedom of 
Imagination: Copyright's Constitutionality, I 12 YALE L.J. I (2002); Rebecca Tushnet, 
Copyright as a Model for Free Speech Law: What Copyright has in Common with Anti­
Pornography laws. Campaign Finance Reform, and Telecommunications Regulation, 42 8.C. 
L. REV. I (2000); William W. Van Alstyne, Reconciling What the First Amendment Forbids 
With What the Copyright Clause Permits: A Summary Explanation and Review, 66 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 225 (2003); Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Intellectual Property: 
Some Thoughts After Eldred, 44 Liquormart, and Bartnicki, 40 Hous. L. REV. 697 (2003); 
Alfred C. Yen, Eldred, The First Amendment, and Aggressive Copyright Claims, 40 Hous. L. 
REV. 673 (2003). This is by no means an all-inclusive list. 
7. In this article I apply the Supreme Court's current jurisprudence governing the 
interpretation of the First Amendment and its application to speech restrictions. I do not herein 
endorse that interpretation, nor do I purport to provide my own normative vision of the First 
Amendment. 
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namely the profit-making purpose o f  an al legedly infringing usc.x In 
addition, a lthough the Court's approach to fair use in Camphell v. 
Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. 9 shifted the fair use emphasis away from the 
commerciality of a use, its new focus, transfonnativc use, also 
diminishes the potential for the first factor to be uti Ii zed in 
recognizing a free speech interest within a fair use defense. 
Transformation, as contrasted with reproduction or distribution or 
another non-transformative use of a work, does not hold any greater 
inherent First Amendment value. 
The Supreme Court and lower courts could acknow ledge that 
fair use does not function as a protector of free speech and instead 
institute separate First Amendment review in appropriate cases. In 
light of Eldred, that seems highly unlikely.10 As a result, further 
attention to the fair use doctrine is needed. Enabling the fair use 
doctrine to perform its assigned First Amendment role would require 
reform. Specifically, I argue that fair use should not focus on the 
commerciality of a defendant's use in the context o f  p urpose and 
character of a use. As such, I recommend that Congress m odify the 
statutory text so as to redirect the attention of the courts away from 
profit motive. Similarly, the courts should not myopical ly view fair 
use as limited to transformative use. A wider range of uses should be 
understood to serve the public interests vindicated throug h  both the 
First Amendment and copyright, and Campbell itse lf  implicates a 
wider range of uses when it is read broadly rather than narrowly. 
These changes wil l  not eliminate the conflict between copyright and 
the First Amendment; nothing ever wil l .  Instead, such changes create 
a real opportunity for judicial balancing of interests s o  that both 
copyright and free speech interests can be more fully considered 
within fair use. 
8· . 17 u.s.c_. 
§ 10? (2000) provides: "In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case 1s a fair use the factors to be considered shall include_ ( 1) h . character of the use, including whether such use is of . I 
t_ e purpose and 
educational purposes." 
a commercia nature or 1s for nonprofit 
9. Campbell v: Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579, 583-85 ( 1994) 10. The Court m Eldred was comfortable asserti h . : . . . and the fair use defense are "general! d 
ng t at the idea-expression d1stmction Ya equate to address" F. t A d . any real support, demonstrating a lack of intere. . fu 
irs 
. 
men ment concerns, without 
537 U.S. at 221. 
st m rther scrutinizing this issue. See Eldred, 
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II. COPYRIGHT AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
A. Copyright's Constitutional Basis 
Copyright grants to authors and their successors-in-interest 
certain exclusive rights in original expression. 11 The scope of federal 
copyright law has grown over the more than 200 years since the first 
federal copyright law took effect in 1790.12 For example, the first 
federal copyright law protected maps, charts, and books against 
unauthorized printing, reprinting, publishing, vending, and importing. 
13 It provided a fourteen-year term of protection, with one possible 
renewal term.14 The 1976 Copyright Act, which remains in effect 
today with amendments, protects all "original works of authorship 
fixed in a tangible medium of expression"15 from unauthorized 
reproduction, distribution, public performance, and public display, 
and provides the copyright owner with the exclusive right to create 
derivative works based on the copyrighted work.16 The current term 
of protection is the life of the author plus seventy years thereafter, or 
for works for hire, ninety-five years from publication.17 
Congress's authority to enact federal copyright laws arises from 
an express power in Article I of the Constitution: "The Congress shall 
have Power ... To Promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, 
by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive 
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries."18 The utilitarian 
philosophical rationale of both our patent and copyright law finds 
voice in the preambular language "to promote the progress of science 
11. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 102-106A (2000). 
12. Copyright Act of May 31, 1790, I Stat. 124 ( 1790). 
13. Id.§§ 1-2. 
14. Id. § 2. An 1802 revision added prints to the subject matter protected by copyright, 
Copyright Act of April 29, 1802, ch. 36, 2 Stat. 171 ( 1802), and an 1831 revision added musical 
compositions and extended the initial term to 28 years, Act of February 3, 1831, chap. 16, 4 Stat. 
436 ( 1831 ). The 1870 Copyright Revision Act, which continued the 1790 Act's separate 
recitation of rights from the list of infringing acts for the first time associated the right to copy 
with books, but its infringement section did not include the right to copy with respect to books. 
See Act of July 8, 1870, chap. 230, 16 Stat. 198-217, §§ 86, 99-100 ( 1870). The 1909 Copyright 
Act protected "all of the writings of an author" and protected all such works from unauthorized 
printing, reprinting, publishing, copying, and vending. Copyright Act of March 4, 1909, 35 Stat. 
1075 (1909). For further discussion of the expansion of U.S. copyright via statutory revision, see 
L. Ray Patterson, Free Speech, Copyright, and Fair Use, 40 VAND. L. REV. I, 40-44 ( 1987). 
15. 17U.S.C.§ 102(a). 
16. 17 u.s.c. § 106. 
17. 17 U.S.C. § 302 (2000). For works for hire, the term is either 95 years from first 
publication or 120 years from creation, whichever is shorter. 
18. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (Copyright Clause). 
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and useful arts." In using this language, the Founde rs appear to have 
justified the grant of a limited monopoly in the writings of authors 
and the discoveries of inventors by re ferring to the greater public 
good presumed to arise from that monopoly - spcci fi ca lly, the 
"progress o f  science and useful arts."19 In particular. the utilitarian 
link exists in the presumption that if the law provides fix exclusive 
rights in writings and discoveries, then the authors and inventors of 
those writings and discoveries will have greater motivation to w rite 
and discover than they would otherwise have. Under this theory, with 
greater motivation more writing and inventing will occur, and this 
greater productivity will benefit the public through progress in 
science and useful arts. 20 
The utilitarian basis for U.S. copyright law underlies, to no small 
extent, the distinction between ideas and expression as well as the fair 
use doctrine. The 1976 Copyright Act expressly prov ides for a 
distinction to be made between protected expression and the ideas 
embodied therein, and it excludes ideas from any copyright 
protection.21 While facts are not specifical ly covered by the statutory 
language, the 1991 case of Feist Pubhcations Inc. v. Rural Telephone 
Service Co. 22 made it abundantly clear that facts embodied within 
copyright-protected expression are treated the same as ideas: they are 
excluded from copyright protection. This distinction between 
protected expression and unprotected ideas and facts (the "idea­
expression d ichotomy" or the "idea-expression distinction") provides 
a general limitation on the scope o f  copyright protection in a given 
19. See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc .. 464 U.S. 417. 429. 477 
(1984); Harper& R�w, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 47 1 U .S . 539, 546 (1985): Wendy J. 
Gordon, An Inquiry into the Ments of Copyright: The Challenges o/Consistenci-. Consent. and 
Encouragement Theory, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1343, 1437-39 ( 1989). 
· 
20. Th '.s utilitarian basis for copyright, while not absolutely controlling of U.S. copyright 
law and policy, has affected the law in this country. See genera/�1, PAUL GOLDSTE�:-.1. 
INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT: PRINCIPLES, LAW, AND PRACTICE* I (200 I). The effect can be 
seen �hen our laws are compar�d to the copyright laws of countries asserting a foundation in 
author s nghts, a more natural nghts-based conception Id A notable d. b . . . . 1vergence etween our system and those systems trad11ional
.
ly based in an author's rights philosophy is the absence in 
the U.S. of a broad, express collechon of moral rights in works of authorsh· S II 
John H Merrym Th R ,r. . 
1p. ee genera y 
: an, e eJngerator of Bernard Buffet, 27 HASTINGS L.J. I 023 ( 1976) The 
�or�I right� of the author provide, in general terms, the right of attribution (or non-attrib�tion) 
o
_ 
t e �or to the aut�or and the right of integrity of the work, as well as the ri ht of d1vulgat1on. In some nations, such as France and Italy th I · h 
g 
d h I ' 
e mora ng ts secured to the author un er t e aw are perpetual and largely inalienable. See id. at I 044. 
21. See 17 U.S.C. § I 02(b) (2000). While the distincti b . . 
first appeared in the statute in 1976 the d' t. . 
on etween ideas and expression 
, IS mct1on was not new to cop 
· ht 1 S Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217 (1954). 
yng aw. ee, e.g., 
22. Feist Publ'ns Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 344 (1991 ) . 
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work of authorship, which means it is also critical to a second 
author' s ability to use copyright-protected works in creating new 
works. By ensuring that the ideas and facts contained within 
copyright-protec ted expression cannot be monopolized by the author 
or other copyright owner, copyright law maintains those ideas and 
facts as the building blocks available to new works of authorship. In 
doing so, copyright law does not allow c opyri ght protection to 
discourage further use of those ideas and facts. This lack of protection 
contributes to progress in the arts and sciences, which is thought to 
benefit the greater public interest. 
A second general limitation on the rights granted to a copyright 
owner under U.S. law is the fair use doctrine.23 The 1976 Act c odified 
fair use in section 107,24 although the c oncept was not new to U.S. 
law.25 In general terms, as stated in an older treatise on copyright and 
later endorsed by the Supreme Court, fair use is "a privilege in others 
than the owner of a copyright to use the c opyrighted material in a 
reasonable manner without his consent."26 That general 
characterization, while helpful, no longer controls the scope of the 
doctrine. Part IV .A. of this article sets forth the details of the c urrent 
doctrine of fair use. 
23. Additional, more specific limitations on a copyright owner's rights may be found 
elsewhere in U.S. copyright law, including the first sale doctrine of § I 09 and the various 
exceptions to the public performance and display rights found in§ 110. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 109-
110 (2000). 
24. Section I 07 of the Copyright Act provides: 
Notwithstanding the provisions of sections I 06 and I 06A, the fair use of a 
copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords 
or by any other means specified by that section, for purposes such as criticism, 
comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), 
scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright. In determining 
whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair use the factors to 
be considered shall include -
(I ) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of 
a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; 
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work; 
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the 
copyrighted work as a whole; and 
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the 
copyrighted work. 
The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of fair use if such 
finding is made upon consideration of all the above factors. 
I 7 U .S.C. § I 07 (2000). 
25.  See infra Part 111.A-D. 
26. HORACE G. BALL, LAW OF COPYRIGHT AND LITERARY PROPERTY 260 (1944), quoted 
in Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S.  539, 549 (1985). 
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The connection of fair use to the utilitarian basis o f  copyright 
exists in the understanding that little in this world, inc luding the 
creative world of authorship, is completely new.27 All works find 
some antecedent in an earlier creative work, whether the author 
consciously understands that antecedent basis or the connection is 
instead subconscious. By opening the extent to which a new work of 
authorship may draw from older works, to include not only unlimited 
uses of works no longer protected by copyright but also limited uses 
of preexisting works still protected by copyright, fair use expands 
creative possibilities for new authorship.28 ln so doing, fair use can 
encourage authors to take advantage of those creative possibili ties, 
which in tum supports copyright's Constitutional goal o f  promoting 
progress in the arts and sciences for the benefit of the public . 
Under our law, copyright's primary goal is to protect the interest 
of the public in encouraging progress in literature, arts, science, and 
other cultural and intel lectual pursuits. 29 Private benefit to an author is 
the vehicle by which copyright promotes that public interest. The 
idea-expression distinction and the fair use doctrine, two means by 
which a second author or other user of a work may re-util ize material 
from a copyright-protected work, are exceptions to the copyright 
monopoly that also promote the same public interest. Moreover, in 
Eldred the Court tied the idea-expression distinction and the fair use 
doctrine to the public interest promoted by the First Amendment. 30 So 
27. See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc . , 510 U.S. 569. 575 (l 994) ("[A]s 
Justice Story explained, '[i]n truth, in literature, in science and in art, there are, and can be, few, 
if any, things, which in an abstract sense, are strictly new and original throughout,'" (quoting 
�merson v. Davies, 8 F.Cas. 
_
615, 619 (No. 4,436) (C.C.D. Mass. 1845)), and "[There is an] 
inherent tension m the need simultaneously to protect copyrighted material and to allow others 
to build upon it [as noted by Lord Ellenborough] when he wrote, 'while I shall think myself 
bound to secure every man in the enjoyment of his copy-right, one must not put manacles upon 
science."' (quoting Cary v. Kearsley, 4 Esp. 168, 170, 170 Eng. Rep. 679, 681 (K.8. 1803))). 
28.
. 
See, e.g., Wendy J. Gordon, On Owning Information: Intellectual Propertv and the 
Rest1tut10nary Impulse, 78 VA. L. REV. 149, 157-58 ( 1992). 
· 
29. See, e.g. , Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429, 477 
(1984); Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 546. 
30. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003): 
[C]opyright's purpose is to promote the creation and publication of free 
expression . . . .  
In
. 
addition to sp
_
urring the creation and publication of new expression 
cop�ng�t law conta1�s built-in First Amendment accommodations. First, j; d1stm
�u1shes be�een ideas and expression and makes only the latter eligible for copynght protection .... 
Second, �he "fair use " defense allows the public to use not only facts and ideas contained m a copyrighted k b l · wor , ut a so expression itself in certain circumstances. 
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while the Court in Eldred gave Congress wide latitude in 
implementing copyright protection under its Copyright Clause power, 
it also elevated to constitutional importance the idea-expression 
distinction and the fair use doctrine by relying on both the copyright 
power and the First Amendment. 31 In so doing, it acknowledged that a 
broad public interest underlies both doctrines - a public interest 
invested with concerns related to both "progress in science and the 
useful arts" and the freedom of speech under the First Amendment.32 
B. Current First Amendment Jurisprudence 
The First Amendment of the United States Constitution provides: 
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, 
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of 
speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to 
assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of 
grievances."33 The development of First Amendment free speech and 
free press jurisprudence34 has moved beyond the raw text, which 
provides simply that "Congress shall make no law . . .  abridging the 
freedom of speech, or of the press."35 Despite Justice Black's rhetoric 
emphasizing the bright-line nature of that language,36 Congress and 
the several states have passed numerous laws that restrain speech and 
yet manage to coexist with the First Amendment. We have laws 
restricting defamatory speech known to be false,37 speech disclosing 
another 's trade secret,38 speech concerning particular ongoing judicial 
(citations omitted). 
31. Id. at 219-21. 
32. Id. 
33. U. S. CONST. amend. I. 
34. Throughout the article I generally refer only to free speech when referring to the 
relevant right protected by the First Amendment. In almost all instances, the same concern 
would apply to the freedom of the press when "the press" is the copyright defendant. 
35. U.S. CONST. amend. I (emphasis added). 
36. See. e.g., Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 157 (1959) (Black, J., concurring): 
Certainly the First Amendment's language leaves no room for inference that 
abridgments of speech and press can be made just because they are slight. That 
Amendment provides, in simple words, that "Congress shall make no law ... 
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press." I read "no law ... abridging" 
to mean no law abridging. 
37. See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964); Beauhamais v. 
Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 ( 1952). 
38. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1832 (2000) (federal statute proscribing and providing for 
criminal punishment of the theft of a trade secret, including theft accomplished via disclosure of 
the trade secret); UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 3(a) (amended 1985) (uniform act adopted by 
more than 40 states, wherein civil l iability may be imposed for the disclosure of a trade secret). 
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matters,39 and more. Thus it is clear that not all governmental 
restrictions on communications impermissibly abridge the protected 
40 freedom of speech and press. 
Modem First Amendment scholarship traces two dominant 
purposes for the protection of freedom of speech: ensuring the 
individual freedom of self-expression and safeguarding our 
democratic form of government by providing for freedom of 
communication amongst the citizenry.
41 Neither theory can perfectly 
explain all the speech freedoms the Court has guarded over the years; 
each appears to be playing a role.42 The Court has attempted to divine 
the extent of the amendment's reach by applying these purposes."
0 
The self-realization theory holds that individuals need to be able 
to express themselves freely in order to fully imagine and reach their 
full potential.44 Authors need freedom in order to express their own 
39. See, e.g., United States v. Jeter, 775 F.2d 670, 679 (6th Cir. 1 985) (upholding th.: 
constitutionality of a criminal obstruction-of-justice statute as applied to a defendant who 
improperly disclosed federal grand jury information). 
40. At least this is true under current Supreme Court jurisprudence. Even Justice Black 
voted to uphold certain restraints on speech, despite the absolutist position he set forth in Smith 
v. California. See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines lndep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 517 ( 1969) 
(Black, J., dissenting): 
While 1 have always believed that under the Fi rst and Fourteenth Amendments 
neither the State nor the Federal Government has any authority to regulate or 
censor the content of speech, 1 have never believed that any person has a right to 
give speeches or engage in demonstrations where he pleases and when he 
pleases. 
See also Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 1 5, 27 ( 197 1 )  (Justice Black joining Justice 8 lackmun 's 
dissent from the Court's ruling that Cohen's First Amendment rights were implicated. which 
dissent characterized Cohen's use of the statement "Fuck the Draft" on his jacket as "mainly 
conduct, and little speech."); supra note 36. 
41. See, e.g., DANIEL A. FARBER, THE FIRST AMENDMENT 3 (2d ed. 2003); ZECHARIAH 
CHAFEE, JR., FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 3 3  ( 1 941 ): 
The First Amendment protects two kinds of interests in free speech. There i s  
an individual i nterest, the need of many men to express their opinions o n  matters 
vital to them if life is to be worth living, and a social interest in the attainment of 
truth, so that the country may not only adopt the wisest course of action but cany 
it out in the wisest way. 
See also ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND IT S RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 
63, 88-89 (1948) (maintaining that the only purpose of the First Amendment's freedom of 
speech is the ?rotection of public discussion in support of our structure of self-government, but 
�otmg that this sole purpose supporting the public need includes other narrower interests within 
ti). 
42. See FARBER, supra note 41, at 3-8. 
43. See, e.g., Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Counci l  Inc. 4 2 5  
U.S. 748, 761-65 ( 1 976). 
' ' 
44. See, e.g., Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 3 5 7  ( 1927). 
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v1s10n, which in turn can benefit the public through cultural 
enrichment. Freedom of individual expression also underlies an 
individual search for truth. By being free to express any idea, 
individuals are encouraged to contribute to the "marketplace of ideas" 
from which individuals and society may choose in the search for 
truth.45 The "marketplace of ideas" premise underlies both the 
individual self-expression purpose as well as the col lective public 
discourse purpose. Under the collective public discourse purpose, 
First Amendment protections do not aim to protect individual self­
realization. Instead, First Amendment protections exist to protect our 
system of democracy by ensuring that public decisionmaking is 
informed to the fullest extent possible.46 Speech restrictions should 
not be erected within the area of public discourse, as that speech has 
"constitutional value because [it] is regarded as constituting 
participation in the process of democratic self-govemance."47 
With the purposes of First Amendment protection operating 
largely, although not completely, as a subtext, two questions in 
particular resurface throughout the Court's jurisprudence: (1) what 
sort of communication constitutes the protected "speech" or "press," 
and (2) what does it mean to impermissibly "abridge" a freedom. 
Answers to those questions help guide the assessment of the 
constitutionality of a law's impact on communicative freedom. 
[The Founders] believed that the final end of the State was to make men free to 
develop their faculties; and that in its government the deliberative forces should 
prevail over the arbitrary. They valued liberty both as an end and as a means. 
They believed liberty to be the secret of happiness and courage to be the secret of 
liberty. 
Id. at 375 (Brandeis, J., concurring), overruled by Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) 
(holding unconstitutional the criminal punishment of mere advocacy of lawless action that is not 
likely to incite the action, and overruling Whitney in doing so, but not disputing Brandeis's 
discussion of the purpose of the First Amendment). See also Nimmer, supra note 6, at 1188. 
45. See Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 119 (2003) (noting that an overbroad law 
restricting speech may cause persons to "abstain from protected speech - harming not only 
themselves but society as a whole, which is deprived of an uninhibited marketplace of ideas."). 
46. See, e.g. , Rosenberger v. Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 831 ( l 995) (tying First 
Amendment freedoms to well-informed public discourse): 
Our understanding of the complex and multifaceted nature of public discourse 
has not embraced such a contrived description of the marketplace of ideas. If the 
topic of debate is, for example, racism, then exclusion of several views on that 
problem is just as offensive to the First Amendment as exclusion of only one. 
See also Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 55 ( 1988) (relying on criticism's value 
to public discourse in protecting Hustler Magazine's speech); MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 41, at 
88-89, 94; Robert Post, The Con stitutional Status of Commercial Speech, 48 UCLA L. REV. I,  4 
(2000). 
47. Post, supra note 46, at 4.  
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1. Communications Protected as "Speech" 
Modem free speech jurisprudence depends largely on 
categorization of both the communication or activity affected by a 
restriction48 and the nature of the restriction.49 Categorization of the 
communication ostensibly helps answer the question of wheth_cr it is 
"speech" that falls fully within the protected freedom, �0 and 
categorization of the speech restriction determines what type of 
review a court will apply.51 After categorization of the speech and the 
restriction, the court assesses the interest promoted by the restriction 
and the necessary fit between the speech restriction and the interest 
being promoted.52 This assessment operates largely as a balancing of 
interests in an effort to determine whether the restriction 
constitutionally or unconstitutionally a bridges the freedom of 
speech.53 
The major speech categories addressed by modern First 
Amendment jurisprudence, including both protected and unprotected 
speech categories, are obscenity, incitement and fighting words, false 
48. See, e. g., Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66-68 ( 1 983) (analyzing 
whether a pamphlet was fully protected speech or instead commercial speech entitled to 
qualified First Amendment protection); Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v .  Public Serv. 
Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 564 (1980) (setting forth an analysis for a restriction on commercial 
speech that provides qualified First Amendment protection to commercial speech); A Book 
Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v. Att'y Gen., 383 U .S. 413, 418 
( 1 966) (providing a three-part test that may be used to categorize sexual speech as either 
unprotected obscenity or protected speech); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 4 76. 485 ( 1957) 
(holding that obscenity, although it is a form of speech, is not protected speech under the First 
Amendment because it has no redeeming social value). 
49. Compare Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (detai l ing the 
three-part analysis for a content-neutral time, place, or manner speech restriction). with Boos v. 
Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321, 329 ( 1 988) (providing a two-part test for a content-based restriction). 
See also E�in Chemerinsky, Content Neutrality as a Central Problem of Freedom of S peech: 
Problems in the Supreme Court's Application, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 49, 49 (2000) (noting the 
Court's reliance on the categorization of speech restrictions into content-based restrictions and 
content-neutral restrictions). 
50. See, e.g., Spence v. Washington, 4 1 8  U.S. 405, 4 1 0-11 ( 1 974) (providing an analysis 
for when conduct is expressive and is to be protected as speech); A Book Named .. John 
Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure," 383 U.S. at 4 1 8  (providing an analysis for when 
e
(
xpres
)
s1on 1s protected speech and when it is unprotected obscenity); Roth, 354 U.S. at 489 
same . 
51. Compare Ward, 49 1 U.S. at 791 (content-neutral speech restriction), with Boos, 485 
U.S. at 321, 329 (content-based speech restriction). 
52. See, e.g., Ward, 491 U.S. at 796-803; Boos, 485 U.S. at 32 1 -29· Cent I H d 447 
U.S. at 568-71. 
' ra u son, 
53. See, 
.
e.g., Ward, 49 1 U.S. at 796-803; Boos, 485 U.S. at 321-39; Central Hudwn, 447 U.S. at 568-7 1 ,  Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council Inc 425 U S  748, 765-70 ( 1 976). 
' ., . .
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speech and libel, commercial speech, and, finally, what we might 
categorize as core speech, which includes both expressive conduct 
and more traditional forms of expression.54 Copyright's fair use 
doctrine does not specifically implicate obscene, fighting, or violence­
inciting speech, as the courts have attempted to avoid judging the 
fairness of a use based on its emotive content or the artistic "value" of 
the allegedly infringing work. 55 Whether speech is libelous does not 
affect whether it falls within fair use or the scope of another's 
copyright. Copyright and fair use also do not directly implicate any 
aspect of expressive conduct that differs from other core speech.56 
Accordingly, my analysis focuses only on core speech, excluding 
expressive conduct, and commercial speech. 
2. Impermissible Abridgment of the Freedom of Speech 
Restrictions on fully protected core speech are categorized as 
either content-based restrictions or content-neutral restrictions. 57 
Content-based restrictions survive First Amendment scrutiny if the 
restriction is necessary to achieve a compelling governmental interest 
and the restriction is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.58 
Content-neutral restrictions, which are often referred to as time, place, 
or manner restrictions, must naturally be justified without reference to 
the content of the regulated speech, be narrowly tailored to serve a 
54. See, e.g., A Book Named "John Cle/and's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure," 383 
U.S. at 418 (obscenity); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447-49 ( 1 969)  (incitement and 
fighting words); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 4 1 8  U.S. 323, 340 ( 1 974) (false speech); N.Y. 
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376  U.S. 254, 266-70 (1964) (libel); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 
U.S. at 761 -70 (commercial speech); Spence, 418 U.S. at 4 10-1 I (expressive conduct); Boos, 
485 U.S. at 318 (characterizing protection for political speech and speech on public issues as the 
"core of the First Amendment"). 
55. There is a general prohibition on assessing artistic value for purposes of determining 
copyright protection. See. e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 5 10 U.S. 5 69, 582-83 
( 1994); Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithogr aphing Co., 188 U.S. 239 (I 903). Courts have, however, 
implicated value judgments within the first fair use factor, the purpose and character of the use. 
See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 972 F.2d 1 429, 1 435-36 (6th Cir. 1992), rev'd, 
5 10 U.S. 569 (1994). 
56. A defendant must be found to have used expression in order for a prima facie case of 
infringement to be made, following which fair use might be analyzed. That use might come in 
the form of any of the exclusive rights under section I 06. Regardless of the exclusive right 
implicated, copyright infringement claims expressly govern the use of expression. No additional 
interpretive link need be made in copyright from conduct to expressive or communicative 
purpose or impact. Moreover, even though a defendant's conduct in reproducing, distributing, or 
otherwise infringing a work will certainly be part of an infringement claim, copyright law is 
certainly not a generally applicable conduct regulation. See, e.g., Netanel, supra note 6, at 43-
45. 
57. See Ward, 49 1 U.S. at 79 1; Boos,485 U.S. at 3 19-21. 
58. Boos, 485 U.S. at 321. 
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significant governmental interest, and must leave open ample 
alternative channels for communication of the infonnation. 59 
The Court categorizes commercial speech regulations apart from 
core speech regulations, despite the fact that the very category of 
commercial speech is based in large part on content,60 and the 
governmental purpose for regulating commercial speec h is often 
content-based.61 The Court's commercial speech jurisprudence 
indicates that it protects commercial speech for purposes unrelated to 
self-expression or self-realization, which in tum sets commercial 
speech and its regulation apart from core speech: 
It is a matter of public interest that [private economic] decisions, in 
the aggregate, be intelligent and well in formed. To this end, the 
free flow of commercial information is indispensable. And if it is 
indispensable to the proper allocation of resources in a free 
enterprise system, it is also indispensable to the formation of 
intelligent opinions as to how that system ought to be regulated or 
altered. Therefore, even if the First Amendment were thought to be 
primarily an instrument to enlighten public decisionmaking in a 
democracy, we could not say that the free flow of information docs 
not serve that goal. 62 
Public discourse theory clearly resonates with the Court's 
rationale for including commercial speech within the "speech" 
protected by the First Amendment. This distinction in purpose behind 
the protection for commercial speech has resulted in a difference in 
the Court' s  s crutiny of commercial  speech restrictions.63 Restrictions 
on commercial speech must advance a substantial governmental 
interest and be c losely tailored to serve that governmental interest.64 
59. Ward, 49 1 U.S. at 791 .  
60 . . See Bolger v .  Youn�s Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U .S. 60, 66-68 ( 1 98 3 )  (identifying 
commercial speech m part by its content, namely, reference to a particular product within the 
speech). 
6 1 .  See, e.g. , Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council Inc 425 U.S. 748, 749-50: �66-69 0 976) (noting that the state law under review banned only �ha�acist adverttsmg contammg particular content, namel y  prescription drug prices). 
62. Id. at 765 (citations omitted). 
63. See id. at 77 1 -72. 
64. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 5 5 7, 564 ( 1 980): The State must assert a substantial interest to be achieved by restrictions on commercial speech. Moreover the regulatory technique must be in proporf 1 that interest. The limitation on expression must be designed carefully t 
t
h
on o 
th St t • 1 . o ac 1eve e . a e .s goa · Co�pltance with this requirement may be measured by two cntena: First, the restnct1on must directly advance the state interest involved· the r
fi
egul
h
atton may not be sustained if it provides only ineffective or remote sup
.
port or t e government's purpo S d ·r  se. econ , t the governmental interest could be 
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Commercial speech that is misleading or regarding unlawful activity 
does not gain even this intermediate level of protection.65 
Even with respec t to nonmisleading c ommercial speech, a 
comparison between the Court's tests for content-based and c ontent­
neutral speech regulations and the test for a commercial speech 
regulation demonstrates that commercial speech receives less 
protection than does c ore speech. The c ommerc ial speech analysis is 
close to that for content-neutral core speech res trictions, but because 
content can play a role in a commerc ial speech regulation, and 
because no alternate-communications-channel analysis is required, 
commercial speech still  falls somewhat below core speech with 
respect to the scrutiny and protection provided.66 Thus, the distinction 
between "commercial" speech and other protec ted speech creates a 
zone where government regulation is presumptively more valid than a 
similar regulation would be if it restricted core speech. The 
distinction, of c ourse, requires that a dividing line be defined between 
what is "c ommerc ial" speech and what is not. 
In its first decis ion providing explicit protection to commercial 
speech, Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens 
served as well by a more l imited restriction on commercial speech, the excessive 
restrictions cannot survive. 
65.  Id. at 563-64: 
[T]here can be no constitutional objection to the suppression of commercial 
messages that do not accurately inform the public about lawful activity. The 
government may ban fonns of communication more likely to deceive the public 
than to inform it, or commercial speech related to illegal activity. If the 
[commercial] communication is neither misleading nor related to unlawful 
activity, the government's power is more circumscribed. 
(citations omitted). 
66. The Court summarized the differential level of protection for commercial speech and 
some of the justifications for t he difference in 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island: 
Our opinion [in Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer 
Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1 976)] noted that the greater "objectivity" of 
commercial speech justifies affording the [government] more freedom to 
distinguish false commercial advertisements from true ones, and that the greater 
"hardiness" of commercial speech, inspired as it is by the profit motive, likely 
diminishes the chilling effect that may attend its regulation. 
Subsequent cases explained that the [government's] power to regulate 
commercial transactions justifies its concomitant power to regulate commercial 
speech that is "linked inextricably" to those transactions . . .  Nevertheless, as we 
explained in [Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 96 
( 1977)], the State retains less regulatory authority when its commercial speech 
restrictions strike at "the substance of the information communicated" rather than 
the "commercial aspect of [it] - with offerors communicating offers to offerees." 
44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 5 1 7  U.S. 484, 499 ( 1 996) (plurality opinion) (citations 
omitted). 
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Consumer Council, Inc. ,
67 the Court began to explore what was and 
was not commercial speech. In the course o f  explai n i ng why the 
speech at issue, p harmacists' advertising o f  prescription drug prices, 
warranted First Amendment protect i on ,  the Court recounted 
numerous characteristics that did not rob speech of fu l l  protec tion as 
core speech: ( I )  the spending of money to project the speech, as with 
a paid advertisement of one sort or the o ther ( for which the Court 
cited to political advertising and paid p lacement of protest-type 
notices); (2) placing the speech in a form that is sold for profit (as 
with books or movies or religious literature); and (3) i n c l uding wi th 
the speech a solicitation to pay o r  c ontribute money (sup ported by the 
Court with reference to decisions related to rel igious so l i c itation and 
other advocacy group fund-raising effo rts).6x In addition, the Court 
rejected the idea that the commercial c ontent of speech (for example, 
discussing the regulation of prices by the government or commenting 
upon the stock market) causes speech to relinquish full Const itut ional 
. 69 protection. 
According to the Court, the question before it was "whether 
speech which does 'no more than propose a commercial transaction' 
is so removed from any 'exposition of ideas ' and from ' truth, science, 
morality, and arts in general, in its diffusion of liberal sentiments on 
the administration of Government'  that it lacks all protec tion ."70 The 
Court answered that question in the negative: even "speech which 
does no more than propose a commercial transaction" c ontributes to 
enlightened public decisionmaking and is thus protected. 7 1 The Court 
did not provide any further exposition o f  the distinction between 
commercial speech and core speech other than to assert that there are 
" d " f� " b h 7J commonsense 1 ierences etween t e two. - As such, Virginia 
State Board of Pharmacy provided only an initial d efinition of 
commercial speech as "speech which does no more than propose a . 
1 . "73 Th commerc1a transaction. e l ater case of Bolger v. Youngs Drug 
67. Va. State Bd. of Phannacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Counci l ,  Inc . . 425 U.S .  748 ( 1 976). 
68. Jd. at 76 l .  
69. Id. at 76 1 -62. 
70. Id. at 762 (quoting Pit�sburgh Press Co. v. P ittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations. 4 1 3  �.S. 376, 385  ( 1 973), Chaplmsky v. New Hampshire, 3 1 5  U.S. 568, 5 72 ( 1 942) and Roth v. Umted States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 ( 1 957)). • 
7 1 .  See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S.at 762-65. 
72. ld. at 7 7 1  n.24. 
73 .
. 
Id.
_ 
at _762. The im_pact of the distinction upon the degree of protection for s eech did not receive significant attention m the decision The Co rt I ·d d 
p 
speech was not excluded from First 
. u 
. on y prov1 e that whi le commercial Amendment protection, greater regulation of commercial 
2007] THE MYTH OF COPYRIGHT'S FAIR USE DOCTRINE 47 
Products Corp.74 reinforced the differential protection of core and 
commercial speech and also somewhat broadened the definition of 
commercial speech. 75 Under Bolger, even when speech does more 
than propose a commercial transaction, a combination of elements can 
identify that speech as commercial, rather than core, speech: 
presentation in an advertising form, reference to a specific product, 
and a speaker's economic motivation.76 Absent these characteristics, 
speech related to commerce will be treated as core speech. 
Although the Court is in fact approaching a point where non­
misleading commercial speech is provided protection roughly 
equivalent to the protection provided to core speech,77 it has not 
reached that point and does not appear likely to do so in the near 
future. The line-drawing between commercial and noncommercial 
speech remains important. The Court has c learly indicated that core 
speech should retain full First Amendment protection - and that few 
lines may be drawn within core speech. As such, it would seem 
crucial that the line between commercial speech and core speech be 
drawn so that we do not mistakenly under-protect core speech by 
erroneously identifying it as commercial speech.78 
speech would be tolerated (as compared to core speech regulation) so that "the flow of truthful 
and legitimate commercial information is unimpaired." Id. at 77 1  n.24. 
74. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60 ( 1 983). 
75. In Bolger, the defendant had distributed pamphlets discussing venereal diseases. 
Some of the pamphlets discussed venereal disease and condom use at length and included the 
defendant's name and identified its condom brand only at the bottom of the last page of the 
eight-page pamphlet. Id. at 62 n.4. These pamphlets could not be characterized merely as 
proposals to engage in commercial transactions, but the Court still classified them as 
commercial speech. Id. at 66-68. They were so classified because they (a) were conceded to be 
advertisements disseminated in return for payment of money, (b) referenced a specific product, 
and (c) were mailed with an economic motive. Id. at 66-67. According to the Court, although 
one of those characteristics alone would not support a determination that the pamphlets were 
commercial speech, the combination of all of those characteristics supported the classification. 
Id. at 67. 
76. Id. 
77. Accord Volokh, supra note 6, at 738. 
78. Cf Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, Who 's Afraid of Commercial Speech, 76 VA. L. 
REV. 627 ( 1990). Kozinski and Banner criticize the commercial speech doctrine, including the 
vague and malleable definition of commercial speech, noting: 
[T)he commercial speech doctrine, like all other shortcuts in the law, is not cost 
free. It gives government a powerful weapon to suppress or control speech by 
classifying it as merely commercial. If you think carefully enough, you can find a 
commercial aspect to almost any first amendment case. Today's protected 
expression may become tomorrow's commercial speech. 
Id. at 653. 
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C. The Intersection of Copyright and the First Amendment 
1 .  Copyright's Abridgment of the Freedom of Speech 
The First Amendment provides, in relevant part: "Congress shall 
make no law . . .  abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press. "79 
Copyright law abridges an absolute freedom of speech because it 
l imits an individual 's  ability to use pre-existing expression. xo As a 
result, it also limits somewhat an individual 's abil ity to convey 
information to others. Copyright abridges speech by prov iding the 
copyright owner a right of action against another's use of expression 
when that expression is substantially simi lar to the expression 
contained within a work in which that owner holds exclusive rights. 
By purposely control ling the use of certain expression, copyright law 
creates a restriction on the freedom of speech. 81 
That copyright law restricts speech, and that the First 
Amendment genera l ly prohibits such laws, does not mean c opyright 
and the First Amendment cannot coexist. As set forth above, the First 
Amendment has not been interpreted by the Court to proh ibit all 
restrictions on speech. Some restrictions survive judicial scrutiny via 
a balancing of interests, and copyright itself is supported by valid 
public and private interests. Thus we may safely concl ude that some 
amount of speech restriction via copyright may well be tolerable 
under the First Amendment. Nevertheless, not all restriction of speech 
via copyright must be tolerated. 
Given that U.S.  copyright law p rovides for a private civi l  right of 
action on the part of a copyright owner, rather than direct 
governmental regulation,82 one might question whether C ongress, 
through copyright, has actually abridged any freedom. This question 
should not detain one long. The F irst Amendment not only restricts 
direct governmental interference and regulation by Congress - such 
as would arise with an explicit restriction on speech taking place on 
79. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
80. See 1 7  U.S.C. §§ 102, 106 (2000). 
8 1 .  Accord _Step�en . M. McJohn, Eldred' s  Afiermath: Tradition, the Copyright Clame. and the Const1tutzonahzat10n of Fair Use, 10 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH L REV 95 100 (2003) ("Copyright, by its nature, restricts expression."). Cf N.Y. Times C�. v: Unit�d s'tates. 403 u_.s. 7 1 3, 7�6 n. * ( 197 1 )  (Brennan, J. concurring) ( implying, purely in dictum. that because 
copy
.
nght restrains only expression, leaving ideas free for use, it does not generally create a restnction on speech). 
�2. See � 7 U.�.C. §§ 106, 50 1 (2000) .  The Copyright Act also includes criminal provisions, but �n
. 
�ndmg a conflict between copyright and the First Amendment I do not look only to the poss1b1hty of criminal sanction. 
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federal property - but it also concerns, and can restrict, the 
availability under state or federal law of civil  actions by private 
individuals.83 For example, the private nature of a copyright 
infringement claim may be compared to a private claim of 
defamation, such as the claim made almost fifty years ago by one Mr. 
Sullivan regarding the allegedly l ibelous nature of a paid 
advertisement in the New York Times.84 The state's provision of a 
civil action against the Times and certain persons associated with 
placement of the advertisement, and the actual use of the action by 
Sullivan in a manner alleged to restrain the First Amendment rights of 
the defendants, was sufficient, according to the Supreme Court, to 
bring the state l aw within the realm subject to First Amendment 
scrutiny.85 Like state defamation laws, copyright laws are speech 
restrictions enforced through private rights of action. As such, I find 
no difficulty whatsoever in asserting that copyright laws must pass 
First Amendment scrutiny even though copyright provides for private 
rights of action rather than direct governmental intervention and 
control. 
2. Analyzing the Competing Constitutional Interests of 
C opyright and Speech 
Both copyright protection and the freedom of speech arise from 
the U.S. Constitution, one from an express power granted to Congress 
in the Copyright Clause and the other from the First Amendment. The 
relationship of federal copyright to the guarantee of freedom of 
speech demonstrates that the two are potential ly, although not 
necessarily always, at odds.  I maintain, as others have before me, that 
despite the fact that the Constitution expressly provides Congress 
with the power to enact copyright laws and only generally prohibits 
Congressional interference with the freedom o f  speech, the First 
83. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265 ( 1 964): 
Although this is a civil lawsuit between private parties, the A labama courts have 
applied a state rule of law which petitioners claim to impose invalid restrictions 
on their constitutional freedoms of speech and press. It matters not that that law 
has been applied in a civil action and that it is common law only, though 
supplemented by statute. The test is not the form in which state power has been 
applied but, whatever the form, whether such power has in fact been exercised. 
(citations omitted). See also Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S.  I ( 1 948) (holding !�at use of the 
Judicial system to enforce a private agreement is state action impl icating Const1tut1onal nghts). 
84. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sul l ivan, 376 U.S. at 265. 
85. Id. 
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Amendment can and does restrict the manner and means available to 
Congress to effectuate its copyright power. 86 
Not al l  Jaws enacted under one of Congress ' s enumerated 
powers overlap with or even implicate the First Amendment 
protection of speech, but some of those laws do. For example, were 
Congress to pass, under its expressly enumerated power to "regulate 
Commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States, and 
with the Indian Tribes,"87 a proh ibition on the interstate shipment of 
flammable l iquids without a permit issued by a federal authority, we 
would find no conflict with the First Amendment. 88 But were the 
hypothetical law one that prohibits the interstate shipment o f  Arabic­
language texts without a permit issued by a Federal authority, the 
analysis would change. Again, the law falls within the enumerated 
commerce power. And yet any contemporary legal mind would balk 
at the validity of such a law when considering it under the First 
Amendment. This abridgment o f  the freedom of speech (not to 
mention of the press) would not be vindicated by any court, even 
following an analysis of any governmental interest pro ffered in 
support, however compelling that i nterest might seem. The 
prohibition would simply be too broad and too restrictive of protected 
speech to be found sufficiently narrowly tailored to pass First 
Amendment muster. 
Both hypothetical laws would survive review if express powers 
necessarily trumped general limitations. That cannot be the case. The 
First Amendment removes from Congress certain powers that 
otherwise would be fully within the Commerce Clause power.89 
86. See, e.g. , Van Alstyne, supra note 6; 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTION 504-0.5 (Leonard W. Le:'y et al. eds., 1 986) (containing Melville Ni mmer's entry on copynght, wherem Nimmer explams that the First Amendment specifically limits those 
powers entrusted to the federal government, including copyright, for "[i]f it did not modify such 
powers, it would have no meaning at all."). 
87. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (the Commerce Clause). 
. 
�8. This law operates within the Commerce Clause sphere and yet does not affect or even implicate the freed�m of �peech that Congress may not abridge. The law does not restrict in any 
m�nne� th� way� m which flammable liquids may be util ized by persons, including their utlhzatlon m settmg fire to a United States flag as part of 
• 
· f · . . . one s exercise o a right to free expression. A
_
s such, no true conflict exists between this particular law, validly enacted under the enumerated mterstate commerce power, and the prohibition contained within the First Amendment. 
89. See Van Alstyne, supra note 6, at 228-29. 
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Commerce-based laws may be found i nval id if they attempt to 
exercise powers removed by the First Amendment.90 
The Copyright Clause does not differ from the Commerce 
Clause in this respect: just as the existence of the Commerce Clause 
as an express power does not allow it to evade First Amendment 
scrutiny, neither can the Copyright Clause so evade the First 
Amendment. The historical sequence of events provides some 
evidence that the First Amendment was intended to limit otherwise 
possible exercises of Congressional powers contained within the 
Constitution as originally ratified.9 1  In addition, scholars now hold a 
fairly uniform view of the interplay o f  the B i l l  of Rights with the 
Constitution, allowing for critical judicial review of otherwise valid 
enactments under enumerated Congressional powers.92 As such, the 
90. The remaining question is whether the Constitutionally protected freedom of speech 
(or of the press) includes the freedom to ship Arabic-language books across state lines such that 
the First Amendment would invalidate the hypothetical law. See id. 
9 1 .  On the other hand, the first federal copyright law and the Bill of Rights were both 
enacted in 1 790, which might mean that the Founders saw no confl ict at all between the two. See 
Craig Joyce & L. Ray Patterson, Copyright in 1 791: An Essay Concerning the Founders ' View 
of the Copyright Power Granted to Congress in Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the U.S. 
Constitution, 52 EMORY L. J. 909, 943-44 (2003). Joyce and Patterson argue that there is no 
conflict between copyright and the First Amendment, and that the historical sequence supports 
this view, but they also argue that the potential for conflict disappears only when, like the first 
U.S. copyright statute, the copyright term is limited to a short period of time and publication is 
required for the existence of rights. Id. at 943-45. But because no discussion by the Founders of 
copyright's particular relationship to free speech has been found, the Founders' view of a 
specific interplay between the two cannot be concretely supported in e ither way. See id. at 946-
49; Tyler T. Ochoa & Mark Rose, The Anti-Monopoly Origins of the Patent and Copyright 
Clause, 84 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 909, 9 1 9-28 (2002) (discussing in detail the 
sources available regarding the adoption of the Copyright Clause, citing James Madison's  Notes 
of Debates in the Federal Convention of 1 787, which reflects that no debate occurred with 
respect to the adoption of the Copyright Clause, and noting that the Clause was rarely mentioned 
in subsequent ratification debates). At least one participant in the ratification debates is quoted 
as believing the Copyright Clause to be compatible with the First Amendment freedom of the 
press, see id. at 924-25 (quoting future Justice James Iredell of North Carolina on the subject), 
but little else exists in the record on the topic. And despite the possibility that the Founders 
considered the issue and saw no conflict between early copyright law and the First Amendment, 
the general argument as to the import of the historical sequence stil l  remains. The fact that a 
sufficient number of early lawmakers determined a Bil l  of Rights to be necessary and advisable 
must indicate that it controls, and was intended to control, Congress's enumerated powers. 
92. For example, Neil Netanel notes that the Supreme Court has applied the First 
Amendment on more than one occasion to restrain otherwise valid enumerated Article I powers, 
such as the power to operate a post office, the power to punish counterfeiting of U.S. currency, 
and the Federal District Clause power. See Netanel, supra note 6, at 38 n . 1 54. Netanel argues 
simply and convincingly that because the First Amendment has been held to restrain other 
enumerated powers, and because there is nothing in the Copyright Clause to suggest that it is 
any different, there is no justi fication for an argument that copyright is somehow immune from a 
free speech restraint by virtue of its Constitutional basis. 
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Copyright Clause does not pose a limitation on th� full exten� of what 
the guaranteed freedoms of speech and press are m the first instance. 
Instead even when Congress stays within the power granted by the 
Copyri
�ht  Clause when it enacts a law, the First Amcnc.lm�r�t provides 
an additional constraint on the freedom o f  Congress to act. · 
3 .  Other Arguments for First Amendment Control 
A rather facile attempt to foreclose First Amendment control of 
copyright might (and has) reasoned that as "property" grantee.I by law, 
a copyright need not yield to the First Amendmenl. 94 The admi ttedly 
93. Van A lstyne argues that the Constitution incl udes the copyright power for mueh the 
same reason that it includes the commerce power, namely, to "provide a pre-emplin· 1mi/i1rmi1r 
of law, in respect to the subject embraced by the clause." due to the "manifest undesirability of 
perpetuating [the] uncheckable pluralism" within the patent and copyright lic.:lds that would be 
created by a "patchwork of statute books, and common law. of each particular state... Yan 
Alstyne, supra note 6, at 234-35. Van Alstyne's position is, then, that the Copyright Clause was 
intended only to replace, and did simply replace, a power that would otherwise be hc.:ld by the 
states. As such, he takes the position that "just as the Commerce Clause provision ' answers' 
Federalism questions but not First Amendment questions, the same is exact�1·  //'lie in re.,pecl 10 
the Copyright Clause as well." Id. at 236. He concludes by stating that the Copyright Clause 
"preempts" nothing within the protection of the First Amendment. [and] any 
feature of any portion of any act Congress has, or may in the future. provide 
under sanction of this clause, may always be brought into question respecting 
whether, on its face or as applied, it offends against the larger freedom of speech 
and of the press provided constitutional sanctuary in the First Amendment sti l l  
unfolding in the United States. 
Id. at 238. Van Alstyne cites Campbell v. Acu,ff�Rose Music, Inc. and Hustler Maga:ine. Inc. I'. 
Moral Majority, Inc. as two cases in which the Supreme Court interpreted the fair use provision 
of section 107 to allow the uses, thus avoiding what would have otherwise been a head-on 
collision of the First Amendment with a claim of copyright infringement. Id. at 238 n.34. 
94. This property vs.  speech argument proceeds under more than one line of argument. 
The first is that the First Amendment does not require the private owner of real property to allow 
the use of that property as a forum for free speech and therefore that the private owner of 
intangible property, namely copyright-protected expression, is similarly not required to al low 
the use of that expression in the exercise of free speech. The second is that fencing off (as it 
were) certain language or symbols, even i f  a speech restriction. is easily defensible as a valid 
time, place or manner restriction on free speech - which incorporates the argument that a 
speaker does not have the right to "make other people's speeches" when exercising the 
speaker's First Amendment rights. As to the second argument - the one that brings up "other 
people's speeches" - misses two issues: first, recall that neither "place" nor " manner" in time, 
place
.
' and manner restr'.ct�ons refers to the content of speech, instead impl icating physical 
location or a characteristic such as volume; and second, it  ignores the definitive First 
Amendment principle acknowledging that certain expression has a communicative speech­
related 
.
power that simply cannot always be equaled by use of synonymous or �ubstitute 
expression. Se� Cohen v_. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 ( t 97 1 )  ("(W]ords are often chosen as much for their. emotive as their cogn
.
itive force . . . .  (!Jn the same vein, we cannot indulge the facile assumphon �hat o?e can forbid particular words without also running a substantial risk of suppressing ideas 1
_
n the process."). In this regard one may be reminded of Judge Kozinski 's rather apt observation that an argument denying a speaker the right to use particular, chosen 
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facile response to this argument is that whi l e  real property does 
i ndeed share certai n chara cteristi cs with i ntangi ble property, i ncludi ng 
the basic pri nci ple of the right to excl ude, the two forms of "property" 
are not si mi lar i n  all res pe cts, part icularly with respect to the i nterplay 
with the First Ame ndment. Real property, with respect to spee ch, i s  
only a forum for s pee ch, while the language o r  expression withi n the 
copyright "property" right is the speech. 95 The two forms of property 
quite si mply cannot be lumped together when exploring the 
i nteraction with the First Amendme nt. I n  addit ion, no property right i s  
s o  absolute a s  t o  rebuff all unwanted uses, parti cularly uses i n  the 
public interest. 96 
In  his comprehensi ve arti cle on the i nterplay of copyright with 
the First Ame ndme nt, Neil Netanel reviews a number of j ustifi cations 
that are proffered for setti ng copyright aside, out of the purview of the 
First Amendment, and he finds the m a l l  la cki ng.97 In particular, he 
argues that the "i nternal safeguards" cla i m  presented by the Court i n  
Eldred si mply cannot hold up over ti me.98 I nternal safety val ves  may 
need to be shored up now and then or suppleme nted, and the alleged 
past harmony of copyright and free spee ch cannot be conti nual ly used 
to deny free speech challenges to elements of the copyright laws. 99 He 
notes that at the time of New York Times v. Sullivan, libel had i ts own 
i nternal free speech safeguards, such as the traditi onally recogni zed 
privileges for bookstores and li braries that sold defamatory material 
originally published by others. 100 Those safeguards di d not dissuade 
the Court from exploring libel's i nfringe ment of free speech i n  
language through mere invocation of the protection of an intellectual property right "no more 
answers the first amendment concerns here than to suggest that Paul Robert Cohen could have 
worn a jacket saying 'I Strongly Resent the Draft."' Int'l  Olympic Comm. v. San Francisco Arts 
& Athletics, 789 F.2d 1 3 1 9, 1 32 1  (9th Cir. 1 986) (Kozinski, J., dissenting). See also San 
Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522 ( 1 987) 
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Judge Kozinski's observation in his dissent in the decision 
below). 
95. See also Netanel, supra note 6, at 39 (acknowledging that real property rights are 
somewhat immune to a free speech restraint but arguing that a real property right poses an 
incidental burden on expressive freedom while a copyright creates a direct burden on expressive 
freedom since the right is specifically directed to information and communication). 
96. And whether copyright is viewed as a property right or economic regulation, it i s  
expressly not absolute - as shown b y  the requirement that an otherwise infringing use not b e  a 
fair use before copyright liability may be imposed, see 1 7  U.S.C. §§ I 06, I 07 (2000), in addition 
to a number of other specific statutory exceptions and exemptions, see 17 U.S.C. §§ 1 06, 1 08-
1 2 1  (2000). 
97. See Netanel, supra note 6, at 37-47. 
98. Id. at 40-42. 
99. Id. 
100. Id. at 4 1 .  
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connectio n  with commentary o n  pub l i c  officials, and it determined 
d. . l t •  
. d J O I that additional, non-tra 1t10na protec 10n was require . 
Eugene Volokh, on the other h and, does not generally dispute the 
copyright "exception," by which copyright ' s  constitutional basis 
differentiates it from other speech restrictions. 1 02 Yet even he argues 
for First Amendment restraint. 1 03 In particular, he argues against 
certain justifications for lack of First A mendment restraints, such as 
the claim that copyright-infringing speech is less valuable than other 
speech because it is unoriginal. 1 04 This was claimed by the Court in 
Eldred when it stated "[t]he First  A m endment securel y  protects the 
freedom to make-or decline to make--one's own speech; it bears 
less heavily when speakers assert the right to make other people's 
speeches."1 05 Volokh finds simil arly unpersuasive the justification of 
a copyright owner ' s  right to refrai n  from speaking, as discussed in 
Harper & Row v. Nation Enterprises. 1 06 Not only does Volokh point 
to the value to listeners of copied speech as a means o f  information 
dissemination and the value that repeating speech may have within 
the realm of self-realization or self-expression, but he also analyzes 
and debunks the comparison of copyright infringement to compelled 
speech. 107 Both Volokh and Netanel  persuasively argue against 
various means that have been asserted t o  remove copyright from First 
Amendment scrutiny. 
D. Copyright 's Speech Benefits 
Although copyright may, i n  fact, encourage the production and 
dissemination of speech, that speech-enhancing qual i ty does not 
eliminate o r  sideline the ability of the First Amendment to shape and 
control copyright. The Supreme C ourt h a s  urged that copyright serves 
a free speech purpose by encouraging the production and 
dissemination of speech that m ay then remain under the l imited 
control of the speaker or author rather than the govern ment. 108 Some 
arguments go further, holding that any theoretical restriction on the 
First Amendment-protected "freedom o f  speech" by copyright must 
I 0 I .  Id. 
1 02. See Volokh, supra note 6, at 7 1 3- 1 4, 725 . 
1 03. Id. at 7 1 4-32. 
I 04. Id. at 725-27. 
1 05. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 1 87, 2 2 1 (2003 ).  
'.°6. See Volokh, supra note 6, at 727-32. See also Harper & Row Pub('  h I Na11on Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 559-60 ( 1 985). 
is ers, nc. v. 
I 07. See Volokh, supra note 6, at 725-32. 
1 08. See Harper & Row, 47 1 U.S. at 558.  
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be countenanced in  l ight of  copyright's pursuit of  this speech­
enhancing, lofty constitutional goal, namely, the encouragement o f  
authorial production fo r  the promoti o n  o f  scientific and artistic 
progress. 1 09 The Court has not rejected this l ine of thought: "The 
Copyright Clause and First Amendment were adopted close in time. 
This proximity indicates that, in the Framers' view, copyright ' s  
limited monopolies are compatible with free speech principles. Indeed 
copyright's purpose is to promote the creation and publication of free 
expression ." 1 10 The Court did, on the other hand, reject the idea that 
copyright is thereby "categorically immune" from First Amendment 
scrutiny. 1 1 1  
The implication, i f  not the outright assertion, of the Court in 
emphasizing copyright ' s  free speech benefits is  that copyright is 
functionally, although not theoretically, i mmune to First Amendment 
regulation in light of its First Amendment enhancing characteristics 
and the vague limitations provided within fair use and the idea­
expression distinction. 1 1 2 In my view, however, the speech-enhancing 
characteristics of copyright's utilitarian purpose and structure do not 
grant categorical i mmunity to any and every statutory copyright 
scheme chosen by Congress. 1 1 3  To use a hypothetical situation for a 
point of comparison: the speech-enh ancing characteristics and 
purpose of a free, government-sponsored forum, such as a local­
access radio station, would not bar a F i rst-Amendment challenge i f  
the regulations apportioning use o f  the forum between applicants 
resulted in suppression of speech from certain groups, even i f  that 
forum provided limited rights of reply. Even if the goal and primary 
function of copyright, like the hypothetical forum, were to encourage 
I 09. See, e.g., McGowan, supra note 6, at 332-38. 
1 1 0. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 2 1 9. 
1 1 1 . Id. at 22 1 .  
1 1 2. See. e.g., id. ("[W)hen, as in this case, Congress has not altered the traditional 
contours of copyright protection, further First Amendment scrutiny is unnecessary."). See also 
McGowan, supra note 6 (arguing that while there may be a relationship between copyright and 
the First Amendment, the First Amendment can provide no real means for judicial control over 
Congressional copyright enactments); Lackland H. Bloom, Jr., Copyright Under Siege: The 
First Amendment Front, 9 COMP. L. REV. & TECH. J. 4 1 ,  6 1  (2004) (arguing that copyright's 
enhancement of speech, in conjunction with the idea-expression dichotomy and fair use, avoids 
"any real, intrinsic tension" between copyright and the First Amendment). 
1 1 3. See Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tomil lo, 4 1 8  U.S. 2 4 1  ( 1 974) (invalidating a state 
right-of-reply statute although it was intended, at least in part, to increase the informat�on 
available to the public); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. I ( 1 976) (striking federal limits on electwn 
expenditures despite the fact that those limits were designed to provide a more equal political 
playing field for less wealthy individuals and groups). 
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the creation o f  additional speech, the goal and function p rov ide no 
ultimate First Amendment protection . 1 1 4 
Because the First Amendment can guide and shape copyright, 
copyright law must provide adequate breathing room for the exercise 
of the freedom of speech. The Court has thus far o n l y  appl ied 
rational-basis scrutiny, rather than a stricter First Amendment level of 
scrutiny, to federal copyright law and its connection to the Copyright 
Clause. 1 1 5 Nevertheless, the fact that copyright clearly restricts speech 
mandates either that copyright law be structured to allow some outlets 
for the exerci se of free speech by use of copyri ght-protected 
expression, when appropriate, or that the courts be wil l ing and able to 
perform separate First Amendment review in copyright cases. The 
specific leve l of scrutiny to be applied to copyright is not my concern 
here. 1 16  For the purposes of this article,  it is sufficient to argue that 
1 1 4. Accord Netanel, supra note 6, at 42. As to copyright's asserted free speech hen..:fits. 
Netanel makes the point that there are other laws advocated as beneficial to free speech in th..: 
form of dissemination of a variety of expression, such as the must-carry rules for cabk 
television or some campaign finance restrictions, and yet these laws are not immune to scrutiny. 
In addition, he argues that copyright's expansion over the years may mean that the free speech 
benefits are shrinking in comparison to the expanded restrictions. 
115. See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 204-08. 
1 1 6. Commentators debate the appropriate level of scrutiny to apply to copyright and 
whether copyright is a content-based or content-neutral restriction on speech. For purposes of 
this article, it is sufficient to argue that copyri ght is indeed subject to First Amendment scrutiny 
of some sort, rather than being somehow theoretically or functionally immune to a free speech 
challenge, including limited immunity by virtue of the presence of internal safeguards al leged to 
protect the freedom of expression. I believe this to be so because my conclusion is that under 
any level of scrutiny used for a speech-regulating law (which copyright is). the restraint is not 
currently tailored in any way to the interest being promoted. In this way, my position may echo 
that of Justice Breyer in his dissent in Eldred: 
I would review plausible claims that a copyright statute seriously. and 
un1ustifiably, restricts the dissemination o f  speech somewhat more carefully than 
reference to t�is Court's
. 
traditional Commerce Clause jurisprudence might 
suggest. There 1 s  no need m this case to c haracterize that review as a search for 
"congruence and proportionality," or as some other variation of what this Court 
ha
.
s called "intermediate scrutiny." Rather, it is necessary only to recognize that 
this statute mvolves not pure economic regulation, but regulation of expression. 
and wh�t may
. 
count as rational where economic regulation is at issue i s  not 
necessan ly rational where we focus on expression-in a Nation constitutionally 
ded1c
.
ated to the free d1ssemmat1on of speech, information, learning. and culture. 
In this sense only, and where line-drawing among constitutional interests is at 
issue, I would look harder than does the majority at the statute ' s  rationality­though less hard than precedent might justify .  
Eldred, 537 � . S .  at 244 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
. 
N.�11 Ne;
,
anel has focused upon the location of copyright within the First Amcndmt!nt categoncal skem (as he calls it) argui th 
· 
· 
d 
• ng at 1t is a content-neutral speech regulation as oppose to a content-based speech regulaf d · 
� · . 
1 . . 
ion, a con uct regulation. or some other category of govemmenta regulatwn. The ultimate thrust of Netancl ·s article is that as a content-neutral 
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copyright is subject to First Amendment scrutiny of some sort, rather 
than being somehow immune to a free speech chal lenge altogether, or 
immune by virtue of the presence of internal safeguards alleged to 
protect the freedom of expression. 
Having demonstrated that the First Amendment can and should, 
in appropriate instances, limit the manner and means available for 
implementation of the Copyright Clause, the next issue becomes 
whether there are indicia of that restraint present in current copyright 
law and jurisprudence. As noted above, the Court relies upon the 
distinction between ideas and expression and upon the fair use 
defense, 1 1 7 and here I focus on the role of the fair use defense as a 
safeguard for protected speech. I argue that the Court errs in asserting 
that fair use is a primary locus within copyright for harmonization 
with the guarantee of freedom of speech. Fair use does not contain 
any real First Amendment restraints. 
II I .  ABSENCE OF A FIRST AMENDMENT PURPOSE IN THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF FAIR USE 
A. Early History of Fair Use 
Our fair use defense originated from the "fair abridgment" 
doctrine developed by English courts in the eighteenth century. The 
early English cases created a limit on the copyright owner's rights: 
those rights included the right to prevent a "mere evasion" of 
copyright by only "colourably shorten[ing]" a work but did not 
include the right to "restrain persons from making a real and fair 
abridgment, for abridgments may with great propriety be called a new 
book, because not only the paper and print, but the intention, learning 
and judgment of the author is shewn in them." 1 1 8 Fair abridgment 
speech regulation, copyright is deserving of heightened intermediate scrutiny as a governmental 
allocation of a speech entitlement under the rationale of Turner Broad. Sys. Inc. v. FCC, 5 1 2  
U.S. 622, 661 -62 ( 1 994). See Netanel, supra note 6, at 47-69. 
Eugene Volokh disagrees, finding copyright to be content-based speech regulation. 
See Volokh, supra note 6, at 703- 1 1 . Despite that finding, with its attendant heightened scrutiny, 
Yolokh does not find copyright to be per se invalid. Instead he argues that it is in fact largely 
valid despite its categorization as a content-based restriction. He compares it to obscenity and 
libel laws in that those laws are also content-based and are yet largely valid due to the 
compelling governmental interests being promoted, which in the case of copyright would be the 
economic reward to authors that our system uses to promote creation and publication of new 
works. See id. at 7 1 3 .  
1 1 7. See supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text. 
1 1 8. Gyles v. Wilcox, ( 1 740) 2 Atk. 1 4 1 ,  1 43 (No. 1 30); see also Tonson v. Walker, 
( 1 752) 3 Swans. 67 1 ,  677 (App.). William Patry provides a comprehensive overview of the 
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eventually developed into the fair use doctrine, both i n  England and in 
the United States. 1 1 9 This early fair use doctrine protected a defendant 
from liabi lity for copying another's work for the pu rpose of creating 
abridgments reviews or criticisms. 1 20 In his monograph on the 
privilege of fair use, William Patry points to Gray v. Russe/1 1 2 1  as the 
first American case discussin g  the concerns that would later be 
molded i nto the American version o f  the fair use doctrine. 1 22 In 
dictum in  that case, Justice Story, sitting on circu it, presented certain 
issues worthy of consideration when evaluating a de fense that a work 
was a noninfringing review or abridgment: the purpose of the usc, 1 2 1  
the effect upon the author's legitimate i nterests, 1 2� and the quantity 
and quality of the portions used. 1 25 
early English cases, including Gyles and Tonson, in his monograph on th.: fa ir us.: ddi:ns.:. See 
WILLIAM F. PATRY, THE FAIR USE PRIVILEGE IN COPYRIGHT LAW 6-18 ( 2 d  ed. 1 995). 
1 19. And during further development o f  fair use, although the ne.:d for limitations un the 
otherwise absolute nature of copyright rema ined appealing to the judiciary and the legislature. 
the idea that an abridgment of a work rightfully fell within the scope of the limitations rather 
than the scope of the copyright did not. Over time, abri dgments were found to be infringements 
rather than fair uses. See 17 U .S.C. § l (b) (1909) (repealed 1978); see also Story v. Holcombe, 
23 F. Cas. 171, 172 (C.C.D. Ohio 1847) (No. 13,497); Copyright Act of 19 1 1. 1 & 2 Geo. 5. c. 
46, § 2( I )(i) ( Eng.) (bringing fair use within British statutory copyright law but el iminating 
abridgments from the codified doctrine, by excluding from infringement .. [a]ny fair dealing with 
any work for the purposes of private study, research, criticism, review, or newspaper 
summary"). 
1 20. See generally PATRY, supra note 1 1 8, at 6-63. 
121. Gray v. Russell ,  10 F. Cas. 1035 ( C.C. D. Mass. 1839) (No. 5.728). 
122. See PATRY, supra note 118, at 19. 
123. Gray, 1 0  F. Cas. at 1 038: 
[ l]f large extracts are made [from a work] in a review, it might be a question, 
whether those extracts were designed bona fide for the mere purpose of criticism, 
or were designed to supersede the original work under the pretence of a review. 
by giving its substance in a fugitive form. The same difficulty may arise in 
relation to an abridgement of an original work. The question, in such a case. must 
be compounded of various considerations [including] whether it be a bona fide 
abridgment, or only an evasion by the omission of some unimportant parts. 
. 
1 24.
. 
Id. ("The question [in an abridgmen t] must be compounded of various considerations 
[mcludmg] whether it w i l l, in its present form, prejudice or supersede the original work · whether 
it will be adapted to the same class of readers; and many other considerations of �he same 
sort."). 
1 25. id. at I 038-39: 
In ma�y cases, the question may natural l y  tum upon the point, not so much of the 
quantity, �s �f the value of the selected materials . . . .  The quintessence of a work 
may be p'.ratically extracted, 
.
so as to leave a mere caput mortuum, by a selection 
. 
of all the 1�portant passages m a  comparativel y  moderate space. 
On this pomt, Justice Story quoted the English case of Bramwell v. Halcomb 3 M 1 & C · 737, 738 (Ch. 1 836), wherein The Lord Chancellor Cottenham stated: 
, y ne ra1g 
When it com�s to a question of quantity, it must be very vague. One writer mi h t  take a l l  the vital part o f  another's book though i t  might be b t I I  
g 
, u a sma proportion 
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Two years later, Justice Story, again s1ttmg on circuit, issued 
another opinion concerning some of the same defensive issues from 
Gray v. Russell in the case of Folsom v. Marsh. 1 26 In Folsom, 
plaintiffs work consisted of eleven volumes containing letters written 
by President George Washington 127 plus one volume containing a 
biography of the President's life, for a total of a lmost seven thousand 
pages. The defendant's work consisted of two volumes in which the 
life of Washington was told through the use of certain of the 
President's letters, with narrative interspersed between to connect and 
explain the story. The defendant copied at least two hundred fifty-five 
pages of Washington's  private letters from the p l aintiffs work. 1 28 
The plaintiff claimed that the defendant' s  use of Washington's  
letters constituted copyright infringement, while the defendant 
countered that his  work was noninfringing although it used material 
from plaintiffs work. The defendant contended that his  work 
constituted a new and original work because it used only selected 
portions of the plaintiff s  twelve-volume work. 1 29 As characterized by 
Justice Story, while the defendant 's work may h ave been a new work 
that "cannot properly be treated as an abridgment of that of the 
plaintiffs [or] strictly and wholly a mere compilation from the latter," 
the work did consist of some copying, as it did "not profess to give 
fugitive extracts, or bri lliant passages from particular letters [and was] 
a selection of the entire contents of particular letters, from the whole 
collection or mass of letters of the work of the plaintiffs. " 1 30 In 
addition, Story noted that "[f]rom the known taste and abi lity of 
[defendant], it cannot be doubted, that these letters are the most 
instructive, useful and interesting to be found in that large 
collection." 1 3 1 
Story recognized that an author writing for the purpose of "fair 
and reasonable criticism" could "fairly c ite largely from the original 
of the book in quantity. It  is not only quantity, but value that is always looked to. 
It is useless to look to any particular cases as to quantity. 
Gray, 10 F. Cas. at 1 039. 
1 26. Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1 84 1 )  (No.  4,90 1 ) . 
1 27. Plaintiffs copyright in the letters arose by bequest of the letters from Washington to 
his nephew, from whom the plaintiff acquired rights before publishing the letters for the first 
time. Under then-current law, the copyright term was measured from publication. Id. at 345. 
128. Id. 
1 29. Defendant also raised other objections to the infringement claim, including an 
argument that Washington's letters were not protected by copyright, although those objections 
were unsuccessful. See id. at 345-47. 
1 30. Id. at 347-48. 
1 3 1 .  Id. at 348. 
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work" and that a "fair and bona fide abridgment of an original 
work 
[was] not a piracy of the copyright."
1 32 On the other hand, he noted 
that infringement would exist in a case where "the whole substance of 
one work has been copied from another, with slight omissions and 
formal differences only."
133  The question presented in Folsom was 
whether the defendant's use of p laintiffs work was j ustifiable and 
h 
. fi "  . l �  t us nomn rmgmg. 
Justice Story characterized cases of this nature, where a 
defendant ' s  admitted use of a prior work may yet be noninfringing, as 
being of a sort "in which it is  not, from the peculiar nature and 
character of the controversy, easy to arrive at any satisfactory 
conclusion, or to lay down any general principles applicable to all 
cases." 1 35 Many later cases have quoted Justice Story' s  particular 
language from Folsom: 
[W]e must often, in deciding questions of this sort, look to the 
nature and objects of the selections made, the quantity and value of 
the materials used, and the degree in  which the use may prejudice 
the sale, or diminish the profits, or supersede the objects, of the 
. . l k 1 36 ongma wor . 
Importantly, Story did not apply each of these factors 
individually to the facts of the case before him. Instead, S tory focused 
upon the value of the copyrighted work and, through that lens, 
determined that the copyright had been infringed: 
[I]f the defendants may take three hundred and nineteen letters, . . .  
there i s  no reason why another bookseller may not take other five 
hundred letters, and a third, one thousand letters, and so on, and 
thereby the plaintiff's copyright be totally destroyed. Besides; 
every one must see, that the work o f  the defendants is mainly 
founded up on these letters, constituting more than one third of 
their work, and imparting to it  its greatest, nay, its essential  value. 
Without those letters, in its present form the work must fall to the 
1 32. Id. at 344. 
1 33.  Id. 
1 34. Id. at 348. 
_ 1 35. Id. at 344. �s put.by Patry, "Looked at out o f  [the context of the facts and Sto 's full opm1�n], the passage 1s of little practical value. Are these factors of equal · h ? Wh ry b conflicts between the factors? D b . h . . . we1g t . at a out . · 0 we egm t e mqu1ry by examming a specific factor? Under what circumstances are we to examine the factors at all?" PATR ·· Y, supra note 1 1 8 at 2 1  1 36. Folsom, 9 F. Cas. at 348. See e c b II · ' . 
569 576 ( 1 994) ( · h 
' .g., amp e v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.,  5 1 0  U.S. , quotmg t e above passage from Folsom)· S C f . . Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 4 1 7, 475 n.27 0 984 Blac 
' on
.y 0� · o Am. v. Universal City 
language even found its way back into E 
�· \ kmun, J., dissentmg) (same). Justice Story's 
Eq. 7 1 8, 722. 
ng is case law. See Scott v. Stanford, ( 1 867) L.R. 3 
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ground. It i s  not a case, where abbreviated or select passages are 
taken from particular letters; but the entire letters are taken, and 
those of most interest and value to the public, as i l lustrating the 
life, the acts, and the character of Washington. 1 37 
Other scholars have noted how important the factors i n  Folsom 
became, and still are, to our statutory law and jurisprudence. 138 Justice 
Story did not treat his factors in Folsom as a comprehensive checklist 
to be mechanically applied in all fair use cases, nor did he intend for 
them to serve as such. The opinion shows that these factors are non­
exclusive, malleable, and adjustable considerations, relevant in some 
cases but not in others. Justice Story simply characterized the then­
current state of the law as he understood it, and proceeded to resolve 
the case presented. He expressly regretted that he did not feel free to 
take other important issues into account, such as the merit and effort 
demonstrated by the defendant's new work. 1 39 
Justice Story 's  opinion in Folsom does not mention the First 
Amendment or free speech rights. Not surprisingly, none of the fair 
use decisions written by Story or his contemporaries discuss "free 
speech." This lack of attention to issues regarding the freedom of 
speech is not surprising, since at the time Story and his 
contemporaries wrote, the First Amendment possessed little of the 
prohibitory firepower it holds today. 140 But in light of the First 
Amendment 's current power and vitality within modem society and 
jurisprudence, if fair use is to be used to protect speech interests, I 
maintain that it would be improper to apply an analysis from 1 84 1  
without taking into account the vast changes i n  the First Amendment 
landscape. 
B. From Folsom to the 1960s 
The case law and scholarship between Folsom and the enactment 
of the 1 976 Copyright Act show that the fair use doctrine broadened 
from abridgment and review to include other forms of criticism, 
parody, and quotation. 1 4 1  This broadenin g  is the primary feature of the 
1 37. Folsom, 9 F. Cas. at 349. 
1 38. See, e.g .• PATRY, supra note 1 1 8, at 24; Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use 
Standard, 1 03 HARV. L. REV. 1 1 05, 1 1 05 ( 1 990). See also Campbell, 510  U.S. at 576; Sony 
Corp., 464 U.S. at 475 n.27. 
139. See Folsom, 9 F.Cas. at 349. 
140. See, e.g., William J .  Brennan, Jr., The Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn 
Interpretation of the First Amendment, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1 ,  1 -2 ( 1 965). 
14 1 .  During this period, abridgments were removed from the scope of the fair use doctrine. 
See supra note 1 1 9. 
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development of fair use during this long period of time. An 1 870 
treatise characterized the general avai labi lity of the fair use de fense to 
a claim made by a commerc ial competitor: "It  is a recognized 
principle that every author, compi ler, or publ isher may make certain 
uses of a copyrighted work, in the preparation of a rival or other 
publication." 1 42 During this time period, courts regularly appl ied the 
fair use doctrine in various commerc ial  contexts; it was not restricted 
to noncommercial uses. The lack of a regular, meaningful  distinction 
between commercial and noncommerc ial use in this period makes the 
insertion of the distinction into fair use in the 1 976 Copyright Act, as 
discussed below at Part 111.D, difficult to rationalize. 
L. Ray Patterson, who wrote extensively on the historical 
development of copyright, argued that in all of the early years of the 
fair use doctrine, at least up to the 1 909 Copyright Act, courts did not 
apply the doctrine to a non-competitive or non-commercial use, 
largely because those uses were not w i thin the scope o f  the copyright 
owner's  rights. 1 43 As he argued the issue, both the fair-abridgment 
history o f  the doctrine and the general restriction of copyright 
infringement to commercial, marketplace uses and not personal, 
consumer uses meant that fair use ori ginally aimed to excuse certain 
uses despite their being potentially competitive with the original 
work. 144 Fair use was not limited to s i tuations where the second use 
did not compete with the original. 1 45 Commerc ial concerns, to the 
extent considered, were subsumed with i n  the inquiry i nto hann to the 
market for the plaintiffs work. 1 46 Through much of the development 
of the fair use doctrine, then ,  courts did not typ ically make a 
distinctio n  between commercial  and noncommerc ial  uses when 
working through a fair use analysis.  
1 42. EATON S .  DRONE, A TREATISE O N  T H E  LAW O F  PROPERTY 1:-; 1:->TEL LECTLAL 
PRODUCTIONS 386 ( 1 879) (emphasis added) .  
143.  Patterson, supra note 14, at 38-40. 
1 44. Id. Jessica Litman concurs: "prior to the 1 976 Act almost a l l  f: · I 
involved commercial uses." Jessica D L . . · 
, ·
. 
. air use case aw 
. 
· l!man, Copy1 1ght. Comp1 om1se. and Lc�1slat/\·e History, .72 CORNELL L. REV. 857, 898 n.256 ( 1 987).  Litman made that statement in th� course of cnllctzmg the Supreme Court's exp d. · · 
· 
· 
· 
. . . ress 1 scn m mat1on against commercial uses and its d1stmct1on of those uses from noncommercial uses in Sony Corp of A u · 1 c·  Studio I 464 u s  4 1 7  
· m .  v . ni versa 1ty s, nc., 
"
. 
· 0984), and Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v .  Nation Enters 471 U.S. 539 ( 1 985), callmg the discrimination and distinction "the Court's · · · 
. .  1 · d on no prior cases to derive them." Id. at 898_ 
own mvcnt1on: 1 1  re 1c 
1 45. Patterson, supra note 14, at 38-40. 
1 46. See id. at 43 (observing that Fol h 
standard for fair use includ d 
. f som, 1 e case generally credited with setting the ' e economic e feet o f a  use as a f: t b d'd of the use as a separate factor). 
ac or ut 1 not include the nature 
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One notable aberration, where a court did expressly distinguish 
between commercial and noncommercial purposes, was Henry Holt & 
Co. v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co. 1 47 Henry Holt involved the 
defendant's use of three sentences from a scientific book i n  
defendant 's advertising pamphlet regarding its tobacco products. 
Defendant, Liggett & Myers, had in its pamphlet entitled "Some facts 
about Cigarettes" asked and answered the question "Do c igarettes 
affect the throat?" The pamphlet stated :  
Dr. Leon Felderman, noted oto-laryngologist, Philadelphia, i s  
quoted ( 1 93 1 )  as follows: "' Statistics have i t  that 80 per cent of 
physicians are smokers * * * It appears unanimous that smoking as 
not nearly so injurious as over-eating * * * From my experience 
with ear, nose and throat cases, I firmly believe that tobacco, when 
properly used, has no ill effect upon the auditory passages. "'1 48 
Despite the brevity of the material used and its inabil ity to 
supersede the purpose of or market for plaintiffs work, the court 
ruled the use infringing rather than fair. 1 49 In so doing, it p laced a 
previously unknown restriction on the fair use defense's abi l ity to 
excuse a commercial use. The court viewed fair use as a doctrine 
designed only to allow 
those working in the field of science or art to make use of ideas, 
opinions, or theories, and in certain cases even the exact words 
contained in a copyrighted book in that field . . . .  in order "that the 
world may not be deririved of improvements, nor the progress of 
the arts be retarded." 1 0 
The court thought defendant's use fell  outside the fields of science 
and art, and it decided that uses having a "purely commercial 
purpose," such as the advertising pamphlets in question, were not 
worthy of the fair use privi lege. 1 5 1 
More important to the court than the defendant's commercial 
purpose was plaintiffs allegation that the use of Dr. Felderrnan' s  
work in a cigarette advertisement h a d  "cast reflections upon his 
professional ethics and (had] brought down upon him the term 
'commercialist,' all of which has contributed to negative and deter the 
147. Henry Holt & Co. v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 23 F.  Supp. 302 (E.D. Pa. 1 93 8). 
148. Id. at 303. 
149. Id. at 304. 
1 50. Id. (quoting language from an English case authored by Lord Mansfield, Sayre v. 
Moore, I East. 361 ). 
1 5 1 .  Id. 
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sale of his book."1 52 As such, the court was actually focusing on the 
influence of the defendant's use upon the market for plaint ifr s  work, 
rather than the commerciality of the use per se. But at the same time, 
the court was also allowing critical or reputational e ffects to 
overcome the proper focus of the market inquiry, specifi cally whether 
defendan t ' s  use supersedes the p lace o f  plainti ff s  work in the market. 
The modem S upreme Court has made it clear that a use that subjects 
the plaintiff's work to criticism or even ridicule does not create the 
harm to be considered in fair use - instead the relevant hann is 
restricted to harm via market disp l acement and similar damagc. 1 53 
In l imiting fair use to works advancing knowledge and exc luding 
uses with a "commercial purpose," the Henry Holt court did not focus 
on whether the defendant sold its work for profit. To the contrary, the 
court equated commercial purpose with an advertising use by which 
defendant sought to profit from a product other than its allegedly 
infringing work. The court did not equate commercial purpose with 
the defendant's pursuit of profits through sale of the defendant's new 
work. 
The decision i n  Henry Holt dev i ated from then then-traditional 
doctrine of fair use. In raising a bar to uses with "a purely commercial 
purpose" and favoring only uses within the same "field of art or 
science," the court largely restricted fair use to uses competitive with 
the original work. The previous trend had been to include all uses, 
including commercial uses, within the broad range of uses that were 
potentially fair. On the other hand, competitive uses - uses i n  the 
same field or uses that might supersede the original - were the least 
likely to be judged fair. 1 54 In l ight of other considerations within fair 
use ignored by the Henry Holt decision, such as whether the second 
use could damage the original work by superseding it, this court's 
analysis i s  unusual indeed. The decision did not gain traction, and its 
commercial-purpose analysis cannot b e  said to have persuaded many 
later courts. Overall, the general trend of broadening the range of 
1 52.  Id. at 303. 
153 .  See Campbell v .  Acuff-Rose Music, I n c . ,  5 1  O U.S.  569, 5 9 1 -93 ( 1 994 ) .  
K 
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c
ce v .  Dana, 15  F. Cas. 26,  61  (C.C.D. Mass. 1 869) ( N o .  8. 1 36). See also 
ar v. urt1s u g o .• 39 F. Supp. 836, 837-38 (E.D. Wis. 1 957): 
The rule is w
�l
'
l
*
s�a�d in 1 8  C.J.S., Copyright & Literary Property § 94, subd. C., (3)'
.�
· 2 1 9. Nevertheless the cases frequently lay stress on the fact of competition, or the lack of it, in determining whether the amount of matter copied 
1s reasonable m amount and character or is an infringement a d ·t · fi 
h h h I . 
. n 1 1s sa e to say 
t at w ere t e ater work differs greatly in nature d 
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. . 
. 
. 
• scope, an purpose from the ongmal, a larger liberty m makmg quotations and abstracts will be permitted than m cases where the respec11ve works are more or less competitive. 
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potentially fair uses, and continuing to include commercial uses 
within that range, continued in the courts into the I 960s. 1 55 
C. Free Speech Interests and Fair Use in the 1960s 
Express consideration of free speech concerns did not arise i n  
copyright decisions until the 1 960s, perhaps because the First 
Amendment had not been, until then, authoritatively app l ied to 
restrain private civil actions, 1 56 nor had it been broadly appl ied to 
prohibit or curtai l  the imposition of formerly traditional restraints on 
speech. 157 When free speech interests were asserted in the copyright 
context, the courts shoehorned the public's  interest in the 
dissemination of expression and ideas i nto the familiar framework of 
fair use, rather than considering speech on its  own merits. 1 58 Two of 
the earliest fair use decisions in which the courts considered the 
public interest in dissemination of speech protected by the First 
Amendment in connection with their application of the fair use 
doctrine are Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House, Inc. and 
Time, Inc. v. Bernard Geis Associates. 1 59 In those cases, the fair use 
and idea-expression doctrines proved capable of being interpreted to 
avoid the possible conflict between speech and the copyright claim.  I n  
both cases the courts ruled i n  favor o f  fair use, and i n  s o  doing 
mooted any separate First Amendment claim the defendants could 
have raised. 
In Rosemont, the Second Circuit appl ied the doctrine o f  fair use 
to the defendant's  unquestionable use i n  a b iography of material from 
magazine articles in which plaintiff owned the copyright. 1 60 The court 
ruled the use to be fair and overturned the district court's grant of a 
preliminary inj unction. The court quoted a copyright treatise i n  
1 55. See Berlin v. E.C. Publ'ns, Inc., 329 F.2d 54 1 ,  543 (2d Cir. 1 964) ("Wh ile indeed 
broad, the area in which a copyright proprietor is permitted the exclusive commercial benefits o f  
his copyrighted work i s  clearly not without limit."). 
1 5 6. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sull ivan, 376 U.S. 254 ( 1 964). 
1 57. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 3 1 5  U.S. 568 ( 1 942) (restricting to the narrow 
category of fighting words the constitutional abridgment of the right to utter insulting, abusive, 
and offensive words); N. Y. Times Co., 376 U.S. 254 (instituting a First Amendment restriction 
on a libel cause of action). See also Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 ( 1 957); A Book Named 
"John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v. Att'y Gen. General, 383 U.S. 4 1 3  ( 1 966) 
(restricting consti tutional bans on works or activities with sexual content to bans on content 
meeting the test for obscenity contained in those cases). 
1 58. See, e.g., Rosemont Enters., Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1 966); 
Time, Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assocs., 293 F. Supp. 1 30 (S .D.N.Y . 1 968). 
159. Rosemont Enters. , 3 66 F.2d 303; Time, 293 F.  Supp. 1 30. 
160. Rosemont Enters., 3 66 F.2d at 306. 
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characterizing fair use as "'a privilege in others than the owner of a 
copyright to use the copyrighted material in a reasonable manner 
without his consent, notwithstanding the monopoly granted to the 
owner. "' 1 6 1  According to the court, because the "fundamental 
justification" for fair use is advancing progress in the arts and 
sciences, "[w]hether the privilege may justi fiably be applied to 
particular materials turns initially on the nature of the materials, e.g. ,  
whether their distribution would serve the public interest in the free 
dissemination of information and whether their preparation requires 
some use of prior materials dealing with the same subject mattcr. " 1 62 
The court emphasized the public benefit to be created by the 
dissemination of the work, a biography of Howard Hughes, and 
resoundingly chastised the lower c ourt for its focus upon the 
commercial nature of defendant ' s  work, which was a des igned for the 
popular market rather than academia:  
[T]he district court in emphasizing the commercial aspects o f  the 
Hughes biography failed to recognize that "[a ] I I  pub! ications 
presumably are operated for profit" and that "both commercial and 
artistic elements are involved in a lmost every [work]" Thus, we 
conclude that whether an author or publ isher has a commercial 
motive or writes in a popular styl e  is  irrelevant to a determination 
of whether a particular use of copyrighted material in  a work 
which offers some benefit to the pub l ic constitutes a fai r  use. 1 63 
A concurring opinion to which two judges subscribed expressly raised 
free speech concerns; the maj ority opinion did not. The concurrence 
considered the p ublic benefit purpose of copyright and how copyright 
laws must yield to the public benefit protected and c o n ferred by the 
First Amendment: 
The spirit of the First Amendment appl ies to the copyright laws at 
�east to the ext�nt that the courts should not tolerate any attempted 
mterference with the pub l i c ' s  rig h t  to be informed regarding 
matters of 
.
general int�rest when anyone seeks to use the copyright 
statute which was designed to protect interests of quite a d i fferent 
nature. 1 64 
1 6 1 .  Id. at 306 (quoting HORACE G BAL L 
260 ( 1 944)) S j 
. L, AW OF COPYRIGHT AND LITERARY PROPERTY 
· ee a so supra note 26 and accompanying text. 
1 62. Rosemont Enters., 366 F.2d at 307. 
1 63.  Id. 
1 64. Id. at 3 1 1 (Lumbard, J. concurrin ) J d L . . 
opinion, expressed skepticism that the I 
. t
g
ff u ges umbard and Hays, m the concurring 
characterizing the plaintiff com �. 
a
h
m .1 was attempting to protect a copyright interest. 
pany as t e instrument of H d H h . . for the purpose of suppressing the bio ra h ,, . 
owar ug es, created pnnc1pally 
g P Y of H u ghes tn order to "restrict the d issemination 
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In the Bernard Cit'is case. the defendan ts copied a number o f  
frames from Abraham Zapruder ' s  fi lm o f  t h e  assassination o f  
President John F.  Kennedy. and then reproduced significant porti ons 
of twenty-two of those frames in the fo rm of "sketches" that 
amounted lo exact copies of the photographic frames. 165 The 
defendants pub l ished those twenty-two sketches in a book crit icizing 
the Warren Commission ' s  analysis and report. Defendants c laimed 
that they needed the sketches to effec t ively demonstrate the book's 
alternate analysis of the assassination and that the public i n terest i n  
having informat ion o n  the assassination justi fied the l i mi ted use of 
sketches. The district court reviewed the common law doctri n e  o f  fair 
use. including quotations from Folsom and Rosemont, as wel l  as the 
then-current copyright revision bi l ls  in the H ouse of Representatives 
and the Senate that contained a statutory fa i r  use provision . 1 66 I n  
considering "good faith and fair deali ng" on t h e  part of de fendants, 
which the court found to be an importan t  clement of fair use. the court 
noted that "wh i l e  hope by a defendant for commercial gain is not a 
significant factor in this Circuit. there is a strong point for de fendants 
in their offer to surrender to L i fe  a l l  p rofits o f  Associates from the 
Book as royal ty paymcnt."167 The court's i nterest in the commercial  
nature of the use related to its assessment o f  the defendant's  good 
faith. The court was not making a separate judgment that a 
commercial use should be viewed as having an i nherently lower value 
than a noncom mercial  use, either with i n  copyright or in the publ ic's  
interest in dissemination o f  speech or in formation. 
Ultimately, the court found that the balance of concerns with in  
the fair use analysis favored the defendants. I n  so doing. the  court 
relied heavily on the "public interest in hav i ng the ful lest in formation 
available on the murder of President Kennedy." 1 6K This public i n terest 
in disseminat ion of i nformation incl uded the dissem ination o f  
plainti ff's copyrighted expression, even though "doubtless t h e  theory 
could be explai ned with sketches [that were l ess complete and were 
of informa1ion about Hughes because he preferred to avoid publicily. Id. For this reason, lhe 
concurring judges viewed 1he case as signi ficanlly invested with free speech concerns. 
165. See Time. Inc. \'. Bernard Geis Assocs .. 293 F. Supp. 1 30, 1 39 (S.D.N.Y. 1 968). I n  
Iola!, lhc Zapruder fi lm contained 41<0 frames. 1 40 showing l h e  immediate events surrounding 
the a.�sassinalion and 40 directly pertinent to the shols that were fired. See id. at 1 33. 
166. See id. at 1 4 5 .  For further discussion of the copyright revision process and the hislory 
of lhc fair use pro\·ision. sec supra Pan 1 1 1.D. 
1 67. Id. a1 1 46. 
16R. Id. 
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not true copies] ." 1 69 In addition, the court found littl e  l ikel ihood of 
injury to the p laintiffs market for its work because p l aintiff did not 
sell copies of the Zapruder pictures and the effect of defendant ' s  use 
on plaintiff s  future proj ects using the pictures was speculative. 1 70 
Writing soon after the Rosemont and Bernard Geis decisions. 
Melville B. N immer criticized both decisions for failing to account 
for free speech concerns separate and apart from the standard fair use 
analysis. While he found Rosemont to be wrongly dec ided al together, 
he faulted the Bernard Geis analysis without disputing the conclusion 
of noninfringement. 1 7 1  In commenting upon the Bernard Geis 
opinion, Nimmer argued that there is a ••grave danger" in fail ing to 
distinguish copyright doctrines from First Amendment concerns: 
[A] grave danger to copyright may l ie in the failure to distingu ish 
between the statutory privilege known as fair use and an emerging 
constitutional limitation on copyright contained in the first 
amendment. The scope and extent of fair use fal l s  within the 
discretion of the Congress. The limitations of the first amendment 
are imposed upon Congress itself. Fair use, when properly appl ied, 
is l imited to copying by others wh ich does not materia l l y  impair 
the marketabil ity of the work which is copied. The first 
amendment privilege, when appropri ate, may be invoked despite 
the fact that the marketabi l ity of the copied work is thereby . . d 1 72 1mpa1re . 
Nimmer argued that fair use, which might excuse the use of 
expression, is  entirely separate from First Amendment i nterests, 
which he saw as concerned primari l y  with ideas. 1 73 Under his 
analysis,  if ideas can be expressed in a second author' s own words or 
own form of expression, the First Amendment cannot excuse the use, 
even if fair use does. 1 74 
Nimmer distinguished between the Bernard Geis case i n  which 
he thought the First Amendment alone s upported exonerat
,
ion of the 
use of the frames of the Zapruder film,  from the Rosemont case, in 
which he thought the First Amendment would not excuse the use of 
th . d . 1 75 e cop1e expression. And on the R osemont facts a s  found by the 
1 69. Id. 
1 70. Id. 
1 7 1 .  See N immer, supra note 6. 
1 72. Id. at 1 200-0 I .  
1 73 . Id. at 1 20 1 -04. 
1 74. Id. at 1 203.  
1 75. Id. at  1 202. A 1 975 article containing extensive o status of fair use essentially concurred with N . 
c mmentary on the then-current 
•mrner as to Rosemont and, to a lesser degree. 
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district court, he reasoned that fair use should not have applied either. 
In his view, the freedom of use of the ideas and facts underlying the 
material copied from the magazine articles provided sufficient 
protection for speech interests. 1 76 
Nimmer argued in part that while the First Amendment might 
demand that defendants be free to use copyright-protected expression 
in some instances, that freedom should not i nclude a complete 
freedom from royalty payments . 1 77 In h i s  view, a compulsory license, 
rather than free use, should be available i n  what he thought were the 
relatively rare instances of First Amendment protection for use of 
expression. 1 78 And although Nimmer steadfastly argued that "[n]either 
the first amendment per se, nor the speech interests which underlie it, 
justify in the name of education or culture the expropriation of 
authorship," he also acknowledged that the "public's  increasing 
appetite for education and culture," along with technological 
advances, "requires a constant rethinking of the place of copyright 
and the proper scope of the first amendment within our burgeoning 
society." 1 79 
Nimmer's analysis in 1 970 of the proper role of the First 
Amendment as applied to a claim of copyright infringement - that is, 
a separate and occasional restraint on copyright claims, rather than a 
consideration to be factored into the fair use doctrine - stands in 
contrast to the Court's recent assertions on the issue . 1 80 It also stands 
apart from the views expressed the same year by Paul Goldstein, who 
avoided complete exoneration of infringing uses of expression when 
defended via the First Amendment, yet approved of fair use as the 
Bernard Geis. See Harvey S. Perlman & Laurens H. Rhinelander, Williams & Wilkins Co. v. 
United States: Photocopying, Copyright. and the Judicial Process, 1975 SUP. CT. REV. 355, 
387-89 ( 1 975) (arguing that both the majority and concurring opinions in Rosemont "raised the 
[fair use) issue to unnecessary dimensions" by referencing the public interest (either via the 
Copyright Clause or the First Amendment) and asserting that the relevant interests in both 
Rosemont and Bernard Geis could be satisfactorily resolved by reference to the idea-expression 
dichotomy). 
1 76. In his analysis of the interplay of copyright and the First Amendment, Nimmer 
concluded that copyright would, in most instances, stand clear of true interference with the 
freedom of speech. He did not rely on the idea-expression distinction alone. Instead, he found 
that copyright's limited term [at the time, the initial statutory term was 28 years with the option 
of another 28-year renewal term] and "the greater public good in the copyright encouragement 
of creative works" combined with the idea-expression distinction to excuse copyright's burden 
on speech except in rare cases. Nimmer, supra note 6, at 1 192, 1 193-1200. 
1 77. Id. at I I 99- 1 200. 
1 78. Id. 
179. Id. at 1 204. 
1 80. See supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text. 
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means for accommodating speech interests. 1 8 1  He noted that using fair 
use to excuse "otherwise infringing uses is an explicit  objective of the 
[copyright] law and rests upon a thoroughly principled basis [namely, 
the publ ic  interest]. Sanction of the fair use defense - which accredits 
the public interest in access to didactic expression - recognizes the 
alleged infringer's standing to assert this public intercst ." 1 x� 
Nimmer and Goldstein disagreed on the relative scope and 
frequency of a First-Amendment-protected public interest in the use 
of copyright-protected expression. They also disagreed on the 
appropriateness of using fair use to v indicate that public interest. 
They did agree, at least implicitly, that commercial use was irrelevant 
to a fair use or First Amendment analysis within copyright. Neither 
scholar referenced commercial versus noncommerc ial uses of 
expression in his study of fair use. And neither scho l ar limited his 
analysis of the validity of a First Amendment-public i nterest 
copyright defense to noncommercial  contexts. 
D. Codification of Fair Use in the 1 9 76 Act 
In 1 976, Congress codified the judicial doctrine of fair use in 
section I 07 of the Copyright Act. 1 83 Congress repeatedly asserted that 
section I 07 simply restated the current judicial doctrine with no 
changes, neither narrowing nor enlarging it. 1 84 Congress also 
intended for courts to continue their development of the fair use 
doctrine. 1 85 Operating in the wake of the Rosemont and Bernard Geis 
decisions and the Goldstein and Nimmer articles, one would expect 
Congress to have addressed how free speech i nterests should intersect 
with section I 07, or in the alternative, to have stated that the issue 
was appropriate for further judicial development. At the very least, 
1 8 1 .  Goldstein, supra note 6. 
1 82. Id. at W56
. 
(emphasis added). But even Goldstein, while placing s i gnificant weight on 
the fau use 
.
�octnne m accommodating the public interest, emphasized that the idea-expression 
d1st1
.
nct1on constitutes a more elastic application of the fair use motive; the rules of the 
ongmality reqms1te and of the idea-expression distinction are uniquely just i fied by the public 
interest that ideas be hberated from monopoly constraint." Id. 
1 83.  Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 94-553, § I 07, 90 Stat. 2541 ( 1 976) ( od· ti d t 1 7  u s c § 107 (2000)). C I I C  a . . 
1 84. "Section 1 07 is intended to restate the present judicial doctrine of fair use not to 
change, narrow, or enlarge it in any way." H.R.  REP. No. 94- 1 476, at 66 ( 1 976); S. R
'
EP. No. 
94-473, 
.
at 62. ( 1�:5); H .R. REP. No. 89-2237, at 6 1  ( 1 966). H.R. REP. No. 90-83 , at 3 1  ( 1 967) (the cod1ticat1on had no purpose of either freezing or changing the doctrine")" 1 22 CONG REC 3
( 
1 44
1 
(I �76) 
[
(the proposed language was "a restatement of this judicially deveioped doctri�e . .  :not en arge d] or change(d] m any way"). 
1 85.  See, e.g. , H.R.  REP. No. 94- 1 476, at 66; S. REP. No. 94-473, at 62. 
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one would expect Congress or other part1c1pants in the revision 
process to have discussed free speech and the First Amendment in the 
debates or negotiations surrounding the codification of the fair use 
doctrine. But one would be very wrong. 
The process of revising the Copyright Act began in earnest as 
early as 1 955, when Congress authorized the Register of Copyrights 
to supervise and conduct a multi-year study of necessary and 
advisable revisions to the law. 186 At the time, United States copyright 
law was a slightly modified version of the 1 909 Copyright Act. 187 The 
Register's report served as the starting p oint for organized 
Congressional action toward what became the Copyright Act of 
1 976. 1 88 
Voluminous transcripts and reports documenting the negotiations 
and deliberations of the 1 960s regarding revision of the copyright 
laws exist in the legislative history. Partic i pants in the process 
debated fair use at length, but no mention of the First Amendment or 
free speech in those fair use debates can be found. 189 The fair use 
deliberations before 1 965 centered upon whether the new act should 
include any express mention of fair use (and if so how extensive) or 
whether the new act should leave fair use entirely to the discretion of 
the courts, where i t  then resided. 1 90 These initial deliberations 
occurred before Rosemont, Bernard Geis, and the scholarly interest of  
1 86. H.R. REP. No. 90-83, at 2 .  
1 87. See S. REP. No. 94-473,  at 47 ( 1 975); H.R. REP. No. 90-83, at 2 ( 1 967); STAFF OF s. 
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 86TH CONG., 2D SESS., COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION: STUDIES 
PREPARED FOR THE SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS OF THE COMM. 
ON THE JUDICIARY, STUDY I , at I (Comm. Print 1 960); 1 22 CONG. REC. 3 1 979 ( 1 976). 
1 88. See H.R. REP. No. 90-83, at 2. 
189. See STAFF OF H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 88TH CONG., 2D SESS., COPYRIGHT LAW 
REVISION: PART 4: FURTHER DISCUSSIONS AND COMMENTS ON PRELIMINARY DRAFT FOR 
REVISED U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW 2 1 6-20, 272-73, 29 1 -300, 3 1 4 - 1 6, 320, 33 1 -32, 350, 359-6 1 ,  
365-69, 374, 379-80, 395-96, 4 1 3 , 450-52, 464-65 (Comm. Print 1 964) (containing transcript of 
advisory panel's discussion of fair use and written comments related to fair use); STAFF OF H. 
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 87TH CONG., 2D SESS., COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION: PART 3 :  
PRELIMINARY DRAFT FOR REVISED U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW AND DISCUSSIONS AND COMMENTS 
ON THE DRAFT 6, 1 5 8-77, 372, 3 75-76, 400, 409, 4 1 7 , 443 (Comm. Print 1 964) (containing 
proposed fair use provision, transcript of advisory panel ' s  discussion of fair use, and written 
comments related to fair use, including commentary by Melville Nimmer); STAFF OF H. COMM. 
ON THE JUDICIARY, 87TH CONG., l ST SESS., COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION: REPORT OF THE 
REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S.  COPYRIGHT LAW 24-25 
(Comm. Print 1 96 1 )  (containing Register's comments on fair use); STAFF OF S. COM M .  ON THE 
JUDICIARY, 86TH CONG., 2D SESS., COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION : STUDIES PREPARED FOR THE 
SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS OF T H E  COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 
STUDY 14, at 1 -34 (Comm. Print 1 960) (reprinting Alan Latman ' s  study on fair use, prepared at 
the request of the Committee). 
1 90. See sources cited supra note 1 89. 
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the 1 970s in the intersection of copyright and free speech. Thus, the 
lack of Congressional attention to the issue is understandable. 
By 1 965, the several years of negotiations, drafts, and revisions 
allowed Congress to consider a relatively thorough copyright revision 
bill, H . R. 434 7 . 1 9 1  The House Committee on the Judiciary held 
hearings and conducted extensive deliberations on the bill .  No amount 
of reading on or between the l ines elicits even a hint that the 
Committee's  hearings and deliberations on the 1 965 bill ,  or any 
parallel activity in  the Senate, involved consideration o f  First 
Amendment issues in connection with the doctrine o f  fair usc.
1 9� If  
thought was given by any member o f  Congress, or any participant in 
the relevant discussions or negotiations, to the interplay of free speech 
and fair use, that thought was not recorded for posterity. 
H.R. 4347, as introduced, briefly addressed fair use in section 
107: "the fair use of a copyrighted work is not an i nfringement of 
copyright." 1 93 Following testimony and deliberation on the bill, the 
Committee revised section 1 0 7  to include the following factors for 
courts to consider, which factors had previously been part of a short­
lived 1 964 proposal: 1 94 
( 1 )  the purpose and character o f  the use; (2) the nature o f  the 
copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion 
used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and ( 4) the 
effect of the use uron the potential market for or value of the 
copyrighted work . 1 9 
That four-factored version of section l 07 survived unchanged 
through almost a decade of additional negotiations, hearings, and 
deliberations. Through the entirety of the record from 1 965 to 1 976, 
1 9 1 .  See H . R. 4347, 89th Cong. ( 1 st Sess. 1 965) .  
1 92. See S. REP. No. 90-1 1 68, at 8 ( 1 968) (reporting on subcommittee hearings on S .  597. 
which 
_
was substanti�l l� identical to H.R. 4347 as amended and reported by the House 
Co'.11m1ttee on the Jud1c1ary); H.R. REP. No. 90-83, at 4, 29-37 ( 1 967) (reporting on H . R. 25 12 ,  
which 
_
was substanti�l l� identical to H.R. 4347 as amended and reported by the House 
Comm1tt�e on the :ud1c1ary); H.R. REP. No. 89-2237, at 5, 3 1 -33,  58-66, 1 94 ( 1 966) (reporting 
on committee hearings on H.R. 4347 and amending the bill). Comments on H R 24 1 2  which 
was su�s�antially identical to H.R. 4347 as amended and reported by the Hous� Committee on 
the Jud1c1ary, can be found at 1 1 4 CONG . REC. I 0346 ( 1 968); I I 3 CONG. REC. 850 I ,  8587, 
8639, 8996-97, 90 1 9, 902 1 ( I  967). See also I 1 2  CONG REC 9409 24065 ( 1 966) ( · · 
. 
· 
· 
, summarizing 
and commenting on H.R.  4347 as amended by subcommittee). 
1 93. H.R. 4347 § 1 07; H.R. REP. No. 89-2237, at 59. 
1 94. H.R. 1 I 94 7, 88th Cong. (2d Sess. 1 964 ).  
1 95. See H . R. 4347 § 1 07· H R  REP No 90 8 3  29 30 · • · · · - , at - (discussing the amendments made to H.R. 4347 by th
_
e Committee on the Judiciary during the 89th Congress); H.R. REP. No. 89-2237, at 5, 3 1  (reporting the amended version of H .R. 4347). 
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there is no discussion of the First Amendment or free speech in the 
context of fair use. 1 96 So even after Rosemont and Bernard Geis as ' 
well as the articles by Nimmer and Goldstein, the fair use-free speech 
issue did not arise in connection with section 1 07.  
Much of the fair use debate throughout the revision process 
centered upon the education lobby' s  demand for a blanket exemption 
from copyright liability for educational uses, including reproduction 
for classroom use. 1 97 That lobbying appears to have had some effect. 
Shortly before the House voted on the 1 976 Act in late September 
1976, the long-unchanged fair use factors were modified by new 
language added to the first factor in the House amendments reported 
on September 3 ,  1 9 76. The House amendments reported on 
September 3, 1 976 stated the first fair use factor as: "( 1 )  the purpose 
and character of the use, including whether such use is of a . 
1 . fi fi d . I " I 98 Th commercia nature or is or nonpro it e ucatlona purposes. e 
House Report accompanying the September 1 976 House amendments 
to the Senate bill states that the change was "an express recognition 
that, as under the present law, the commercial or non-profit character 
of an activity, while not conclusive with respect to fair use, can and 
196 .  See H.R. REP. No. 94- 1 733,  at 7, 70 ( 1 976); H.R. REP. No. 94- 1476, at 5, 65-74, 202 
( 1 976); s. REP. No. 94-473, at 5, 6 1 -67 ( 1 975); s. REP . No. 94-92, at 7 ( 1 975); s. REP. No. 93-
1 135, at 7-8 ( 1974); S. REP. No. 93-983, at I 0- 1 1 , 1 1 5- 1 20 ( 1 974); S. REP. No. 9 1 - 1 2 1 9, at 5 
( 1970); S. REP. No. 9 1 -5 1 9, at 8-9 ( 1 969); s. REP. No. 90- 1 1 68, at 8; H .R. REP. No. 90-83, at 4, 
29-37; H.R. REP. No. 89-2237, at 5, 3 1 -33, 58-66, 1 94 ;  1 22 CONG. REC. 28 1 7, 2 834, 3 1 44, 
383 5, 3843 , 26234, 3 1 980-8 1 ,  3 1 983, 3 1 986-89 ( 1 976); 1 20 CONG. REC. 224 1 1 ,  30342, 3 036 1 ,  
30402, 30500 (1974); 1 1 9 CONG. REC. 9389 ( 1 973); 1 1 4 CONG. REC. 1 0346 ( 1 968); 1 1 3 CONG . 
REC. 8501 , 8587, 8639, 8996-97, 90 1 9, 902 1 ( 1 967); 1 1 2 CONG. REC. 9409, 24065 ( 1 966). Cf 
H.R. REP. No. 90-83, at 254 (mentioning the First Amendment right of freedom of speech, but 
only in the context of copyright regulations related to community antenna television (comments 
of Rep. Basil L. Whitener)). 
197. See, e.g., H . R. REP. No. 94-1 733, at 70; H.R. REP. NO. 94- 1 476, at 65-72; S. REP. No. 
93- 1 1 35, at 7; S. REP. No. 93-983, at I 1 5-20; s. REP. No. 9 1 -5 1 9, at 8; H.R. REP. No. 90-83, at 
29-37; H.R. REP. No. 89-2237, at 58-66; STAFF OF H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 88TH CONG., 
2o SESs., COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION: PART 4: FURTHER DISCUSSIONS AND COMMENTS ON 
PRELIMINARY DRAFT FOR REVISED U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW 2 1 9-20, 3 3 1 ,  350, 359-6 1 ,  365-69, 
376-80, 413, 450-52, 464-65 (Comm. Print 1 964); 1 20 CONG. REC. 30402 ( 1 974). 
198. Compare S. 22,  94th Cong. § 107 ( 1 975) (text of section 107 before September 3 ,  
1976 amendment), and 1 22 CONG. REC. 3843 (providing the text of section 1 07 within S.22, as 
it existed on February 1 9, 1 976), and S. REP. No. 94-473, at 5, 62 ( 1 975) (containing the 
Judiciary Committee's report on S. 22 and including an unamended section I 07), with H .R. REP. 
No. 94- 1 733, at 70 ( 1 976) (Conf. Rep.) (describing and adopting the House amendments to 
section 107 in the conference version of S. 22), and H .R. REP. No. 94- 1476, at 5, 66 ( 1 976) 
(adding the phrase "including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit 
educational purposes" to the first factor and injecting the parenthetical phrase "(includ�ng 
multiple copies for classroom use)" after the word "teaching" i n  the first paragraph of section 
107). 
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should be weighed along with other factors in fair use decisions." 199 
No further explanation or substantiation of that statement e x ists in the 
record. The conference report does not provide any reason for 
accepting the amendment as part of the conference bill .  200 The House 
Report continued to characterize the overall intent behind the section 
1 07 fair use provision as a restatement of the current j udicial  doctrine 
- with no changes.20 1 The conference b i l l  passed both the H ouse and 
the Senate on September 30, 1 976, and President Ford signed it 
shortly thereafter. The four factors in section 1 07 remain unchanged 
today.202 
E. The Effect of Codification 
The legislative history demonstrates that Congress d i d  not intend 
for the 1 976 Act to alter the fai r  use doctrine. The late addition of 
language regarding commercial  and nonprofit educational uses 
frustrated that intent. The fact is that Congress did alter the fair use 
doctrine in 1 976.203 Moreover, even apart from the spec i fic  language 
chosen for the statute, the very codification of fair use wrought its 
own alteration o f  the previous l y  organic doctrine. The legis lative 
history indicates that Congress desi red for judicial  development of 
fair use to continue as it had before the 1 976 Act.204 Nevertheless, 
199. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 66. As characterized by a later commentator. the addition 
of the language 
-
�as n?nsubstantive, and instead "a poli tical sop to an unhappy interest group. 
[throug� reco�mt1on] m the statute itself that their type of use was one that might be fair in 
appropriate c1�cumstanc_es." PATRY, supra note 1 1 8, at 422; William F. Patry & Shira Perlmutter, Fair Use Misconstrued: Profit, Presumptions, and Parodi·. 1 1  CARDOZO ARTS & 
ENT. L.J. 667, 678-79 ( 1 992). 
. 
200. See H.R. REP. No. 94- 1733 at 70. 
20 1 .  
text. 
See H . R .  REP. No 94-1 476 at 66 S l · · . ee a so supra notes 1 84- 1 85 and accompanying 
ha 
2�2· Altho�gh the preamble and four factors of section 1 07 have not changed, the section 
I O�Ae�: ��herwise amended since the 1 976 enactment. In 1 990, with the addition of section e Co�ynght Act, which added certai n  moral rights for works of visual art the ��;:n�e 1� s:c�o� I 06 in the first sentence was expanded to include bo;h sections I O� and 
I t 
· 
ee u 
· · 
o. I O l -650, § 607, 1 04 Stat. 5 1 32 ( 1 990). And in 1 99"' Congress added the 
as sentence· "The fact th t k · · 
-
· 
fi d' . 
· 
d 
a . a wor is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of fair use if such m mg is ma e upon consideration of all the above factors " Pub L No I 0., 49., 1 06 s 
3 145 ( 1 992). 
· · · · - - -· tat. 
203. Accord PATRY supra note 1 1 8 at 4 1 4  A fi . . . 
to focusing attention on ' . 1 
' 
· s urther detailed in this article. in addition 
commerc1a versus nonprofit educat' 1 
consideration of the four l isted f; t d 
iona purposes. section l 07 made 
ac ors man atory. fd. 
204. See H.R. REP. No. 94- 1476, at 66 ( 1 976); S .  REP. No. 94-473. at 62 ( 1 975) .  
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subsequent development in the courts has not been robust, to the 
extent it has occurred at a l I .205 
We can see that the four factors in section 1 07 echo the p assage 
from Folsom and later cases in some ways, although not in all  
particulars.206 Unlike Justice Story's opinion in Folsom, section 107 
makes consideration of the listed factors mandatory. 201 In that regard, 
Congress should have recalled Justice Story's express 
characterization of fair use as a doctrine wherein no "general 
principles applicable to al l  cases" could be delineated.208 By codifying 
mandatory factors for a fair use analysis, Congress communicated to 
the courts that general principles of fair use applicable to all cases 
exist and that the courts are required to apply those principles to all  
cases. Despite its stated intentions not to c h ange the doctrine and not 
to hinder its judicial development and flexibi l i ty, Congress did just 
that in 1976. 
Particularly disturbing for the alleged flexibility of fair use for 
defendants raising First Amendment concerns i s  the shi ft in analysis 
wrought by the addition of "use . . . of a commercial nature" as a 
specific consideration for the courts. The added language m akes 
commercial use a sub-factor within purpose and character of a use. 
205. Accord Litman, supra note 144, at 899 ("A copyright scheme needs flexibility, and 
the 1976 Act reposes most of that flexibility in its fair use provision. The Court's refonnulation 
of fair use has restricted its avai labil ity for commercial  uses, removed its flexibility and ti lted 
the balance between owners and users to the copyright owners' advantage."). 
206. Compare 1 7  U .S.C. § I 07 (2000) (providing four nonexclusive factors to consider i n  
evaluating a claim o f  non i n  fringing fair use, including these three: "the purpose and character of  
the use, . . .  the amount and substantial ity of  the portion used in relation to  the copyrighted work 
as a whole[,] and the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted 
work."), with Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 348 (C.C.D. Mass. 1 84 1 )  (No. 4,90 I ) : 
[W)e must often, in deciding questions of this sort, look to the nature and objects 
of the selections made, the quantity and value of the materials used, and the 
degree in which the use may prejudice the sale, or diminish the profits, or 
supersede the objects, of the original work. 
William Patry characterizes the first statutory fair use factor as Folsom 's first factor "slightly 
rephrased." PATRY, supra note 1 1 8, at 24. On the other hand, Ray Patterson argued that "the 
purpose and character of the use" did not arise from Justice Story' s  "the nature and objects of  
the selections made," contrary to  assertions of  that i lk by Patry and others. Patterson, supra note 
14, at 43 n. 1 4 1 .  Patterson advocated instead for an analysis o f  "nature and objects of the 
selections" as referring to the portions of the original work selected for use by the defendant, 
rather than the use of those portions within defendant's new work. Id. 
207. Despite the fact that section 1 07 makes the l ist  of factors nonexclusive, few opinions 
include considerations beyond those l isted, and the interpretation and application of the �isted 
factors is quite literal and rather inflexible. One additional factor considered in some cases ts the 
presence or absence of good faith by defendant. See, e.g., PATRY, supra note 1 I 8, at 4 1 5  n. 1 4  
(listing cases).  
208. Folsom, 9 F. Cas. at 344. 
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Commercial ity appears to weigh against fair use in l ight of its 
juxtapos1t1on with "nonprofit . 
education
.
al  purposes. Th is 
unexplained financial categorization of  th� mte:ests. served by an 
allegedly fair  use, elevated as it is by mclus1on I ll the express 
language of the statute, has posed an ever- 111orc-pn�hkm<�t1c 
contradiction with First Amendment i nterests owr the years lol lowmg 
its codification. 
Section l 07 reflects an attempt to de fine, a lbeit on a case-by­
case basis, certain uses that are simply not to be incl uded within the 
copyright owner's control (including reproduc tion s , performances, 
and all  other uses implicated by the exclus ive righ ts grantcd to a 
copyright owner) . In light of Congress 's  intent to leave t he doctrine 
unchanged and allow continued j ud i cial development.  the attcmpt to 
define fair  use in the Copyright Act  may have been misguided. 
Regardless of whether the attempt was misguided as a general matter. 
it is c lear that Congress h arbored no particular intent  either to 
maintain or to modify the doctrine i n  light of copyright 's  potential 
conflict w ith free speech interests. 
Neither Congress nor the industry members partic ipating in the 
addition of section l 07 to the Copyright Act ever considered the 
intersection of fair use and freedom of speech.209 A careful study of 
the fair-use-related portions o f  the voluminous legislative history of 
the l 976 Copyright Act reveal s  no m ention of the Fi rst Amendment 
or the freedom of speech. Congress never intended section I 07 to 
serve as a safety valve for First A mendment concerns. The previous 
jurisprudence of fair use simi l arly developed large l y  independent of 
ti h 2 1 0  Th . . . h ree speec concerns. us, one question remams wit  respect to 
the Court 's  reliance on fair use to vindicate free speech interests -
namely whether, despite the lack of a historical or structural purpose 
to accommodate free speech, fair  use does in fact operate with First 
Amendment sensitivity. 
209. See STAFF OF H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 88TH CONG., 2D SESS .. COPYRIGHT LAW 
REVISION: PART 4: FURTHER DISCUSSIONS AND COM MENTS ON PRELIMINARY DRAFT FOR 
REVISED U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW 2 1 6-20, 272-73, 29 1 -300, 3 1 4- 1 6, 320, 33 1 -32. 3 50. 359-6 1 .  
365�69, 374, 3;9-8.0, 39�-96, 4 1 3, 450-52, 464-65 (Comm. Print 1 964) (containing transcript of advisory panel s discussion of fair use and written comments related to fair use); STAFF OF H.  COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 87TH CONG., 2D SESS.,  COPYRIGHT LAW REVIS ION : PART 3 :  PRELIMINARY DRAFT FOR REVISED U.S. COPYRIGHT L A W  A N D  DISCUSSIONS AND COMMENTS ON THE DR�FT 6, 1 5 8�7?, 372, 375-76, 400, 409, 4 1 7 , 443 (Comm. Print 1 964) (containing proposed fa1r use prov1s10n, transcript of advisory pane l ' s  discussion of fair use, and written comments related to fair use, including commentary by Melville N immer). 
2 1 0. See supra Part III.A-B. 
2007] THE MYTH Of COPYRI GHT'S FAIR LJSc DOCTRINE 77 
IV. MODERN FAIR USE DOCTRIN E AND FI RST AMENDMENT 
INTERESTS 
A. The Fair Use Factors a_( Section 1 0 7  
When we analyze the statutory embodiment of fair use for a First 
Amendment purpose or First Amendment-sensitive result, we see that 
the language of section I 07 does not respect, much less conform to, 
First Amendment values.2 1 1  In fact, while certain elements within the 
analysis do not interfere with current First Amendment principles as 
set forth by the Supreme Court, others elements actually contradict 
those principles. 
l .  Purpose and Character of the Use 
The first fair use factor instructs courts to consider "the purpose 
and character of the use, including whether such use is of a 
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes."2 1 2 The 
language of this factor relates back to the first paragraph of section 
1 07, which states broadly that "the fair use of a copyrighted work . . . 
for purposes such as criticism, comment, news report, teaching 
(including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarsh ip, or 
research, is not an infringement of copyright."2 1 3  This broad statement 
is followed, in turn, by a requirement that a court consider all four of  
the listed fair use factors in making a fair use determination.2 14  The 
2 1 1 .  Section I 07 of the Copyright Act provides: 
Notwithstanding the provisions of sections I 06 and I 06A, the fair use of a 
copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords 
or by any other means specified by that section, for purposes such as criticism, 
comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), 
scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright. In determining 
whether the use made of a work in any particular case i s  a fair use the factors to 
be considered shall include -
( I )  the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of 
a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; 
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work; 
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the 
copyrighted work as a whole; and 
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the 
copyrighted work. 
The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of fair use if such 
finding is made upon consideration of all the above factors. 
17 U.S.C. § 1 07. 
2 1 2. 1 7  U.S.C. § 1 07( 1 ). 
2 13 .  1 7  U.S.C. § 1 07 .  
2 1 4. Id. 
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i l lustrative uses in the first paragraph provide courts with a non­
exclusive list of examples of the types of purposes with positive fair 
use value. The "such as" language i n dicates that additional purposes 
or uses o f  other character may yet be fair; however, the purpose and 
character inquiry remains overall an i nvestigation into why the second 
use of the expressive material was made. If the inquiry into why the 
expressive material was used were sufficiently broad, it could 
encompass uses for protected free speech purposes. 
But the design of the first fair use factor opposes certain First 
Amendment values, both by narrowing the courts' field of vision and 
by improperly discriminating between uses of vary i ng purpose and 
character. It disadvantages noncommercial speech that has a profit 
motive by calling it use of a "commercial nature" and counterposing 
that speech against speech for "non-profit educational purposes." All 
judges, i ncluding the Justices o f  the Supreme Court, i nterpret this 
juxtaposition to mean that all for-profi t  uses receive less respect under 
the first factor, the purpose and character of the use.2 1 5  In disfavoring 
all "commerc ial use" by using a profit-motivated line for commercial 
use, this factor disfavors most works of fiction, biographies, 
newspapers, news broadcasts, political fundraising uses, and even 
scholarly works that are published and sold on the market. The First 
Amendment does not disfavor these forms of speech; o n  the contrary, 
it provides them with full protection. 
The First Amendment does not tolerate discrimi nation against 
speech simply because it is sold for monetary profit (or other reward 
to the seller).2 1 6  Simi larly, F i rst Amendment protection does not 
diminish merely because a speaker has been paid to pri nt  or otherwise 
disseminate a message.2 1 7  Current F i rst Amendment j urisprudence 
does provide lesser protection to "commercial speech," as that term is 
2 1 5 . Courts no longer apply to profitable uses a firm presumption against fair use, but 
profit-seeking by th.e party alleging fair use sti ll weighs in favor of infringement. See Campbell 
v. Ac�ff-Ro�e �us1c, Inc., 5 1 0  U.S. 569, 583-85 ( t 994). In unambiguously rebuking the tower 
courts application of a legal presumption against commercial uses, the Campbell Court 
observed that the presumption would "swallow nearly alt of the i llustrative uses" in the first 
paragraph �.� section I 07, which uses are set forth as the types of uses that may be fair, because 
those uses
. 
are generally conducted for profit in this country."' fd. at 584 (quoting Harper & 
Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 47 1 U.S. 539, 592 ( t 985) (Brennan, J . ,  dissenting)). 
2 1 6. See, e.g., Smith v. California, 3 6 1  U.S. 1 47 ,  1 50 ( 1 959) (books are fully protected 
speech); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S.  495, 501  ( 1 952) (motion p ictures); Breard v. 
Alexandria, 34 1 U .S .  622, 642 ( 1 95 1 )  ("We agree that the fact that periodicals are sold does not 
put them ?eyond the protection of the First Amendment."). See also Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy 
v. Va. Citizens Consumer Counci l ,  Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 7 6 1  ( 1 976). 
2 1 7. See. e.g. , N . Y .  Times Co. v. Sullivan. 376 U.S.  254, 265-66 ( 1 964). 
2007] THE MYTH Of COPYRIGHT'S FAIR USE DOCTRINE 79 
understood in the case law. As set forth in Part 11 .B.2 above, the 
Supreme Court's First Amendment "commercial speech" category is 
much narrower than section I 07 's use "of a commercial nature·" i t  ' 
does not encompass all profit-motivated or profit-making speech. 
With the first factor's focus upon profit, fair use disadvantages much 
noncommercial but profit-related speech. Noncommercial not-for­
profit speech is advantaged. The First Amendment does not 
countenance such a divide.2 1 8  
2 .  The Other Fair Use Factors 
If the remainder of the fair use analysis included an express 
balance and consideration of First Amendment interests, of course, 
the difficulties presented by the first factor might be of little ultimate 
consequence. After all, none of the factors are dispositive, and all are 
to be considered. The problem is that while the remaining factors may 
coordinate well with within copyright, i. e. , accommodating second­
user creativity without overly damaging first-user reward, the 
remaining factors do not contain any First Amendment sensitivity that 
can salvage the damage done under the express language of the first 
factor. 
The second fair use factor, which directs a court to consider "the 
nature of the copyrighted work,"2 1 9  favors fictional, creative works 
over non-fiction, factual works. This means that a fictional work is 
less likely to be found to have been fair ly  used than a factual work, al l  
other considerations being equal. This factor re-emphasizes the idea­
expression distinction within copyright220 and copyright' s  lack of 
protection for facts even when those facts are contained within 
copyright-protected expression.22 1 It does not speak to any First 
Amendment issue outside the idea-expression and fact-expression 
distinctions. 222 
2 1 8. See Va. Stale Bd. , 425 U.S. at 76 1 .  See also supra Part 1 1 .8.2. 
2 1 9. 17 U.S.C. § 1 07(2) (2000). 
220. See 17 U.S.C. § 1 02(b) (2000). 
22 1 .  See Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v .  Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U . S .  340 ( 1 99 1 ). 
222. Insofar as we believe in the Constitutional clause's statement that copyright i s  
designed to promote learning, i t  might seem that promotion of  learning is indeed enhanced by 
making factual works "easier" to fairly use. At the same time, if we think of our copyright 
system as a utilitarian-reward system, the second fair use factor actually discourages (in a 
relative sense) the creation of idea-factual works in favor of the creation of fictional, creative 
works in light of the greater protection of fictional-creative works by virtue of their tr�atm�nt 
within fair use. As such, the second factor may in fact contravene the system of ut1iltanan 
rewards intended to enhance learning, if indeed learning is more enhanced by i dea-factual 
dissemination than by creative dissemination. 
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The third fair use factor is "the amount and substantial ity of the 
portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole ... ��.i !he 
qualitative "value" of the expression to the origi�a l  work recc1v�s 
consideration a long with the quantitative amount.--4 I n  general. this 
provides the creator of a second work some li mited leeway to use a 
small amount o f  expression from a c o pyright-protected work as long 
as the use does not take the core or heart of the original work. In 
copyright pol icy terms, the abi l ity to use a l imi ted amount of 
copyrighted material supports an overall increase in authorial 
productivity while attempting to avoid the interference with monetary 
and non-monetary rewards to copyright owners that might occur with 
extensive uses of expressive material .  This overall  increase in creat ive 
production is accomplished by providing comfort and protection for 
some o f  the appropriate borrowing and cross-ferti l ization that is 
necessary for a new work. 
W h i l e  a c lear connection to internal copyright pol icy exists, there 
is no operative connection between t h e  third factor and free speech. 
Within First Amendment jurisprudence, the amount of expression a 
speaker projects i s  irrelevant. Movies and novels have been protected 
just as much as Cohen ' s  brief statement, "Fuck the Dra ft."225 I do not 
argue that the third fair use factor rises to the level of v i o l ating a First 
Amendment principle, as I do with t h e  first factor. Nonethel ess, the 
analysis of quantity and quality does not possess any First 
Amendment benefits that ameliorate the damage done under the first 
factor. 
The final fa i r  use factor, the effect of the use on t h e  value of or 
the market for the copyrighted work, 226 clearly attempts to vindicate 
copyright' s  internal purpose of motivating production by providing 
for authorial reward. The factor tries to avoid significant interference 
with the reward that is "due" the auth or under our system, even while 
tolerating insigni ficant interferences. In contrast, w h en the First 
Amendment is at stake, we never ask what the financial  effect was 
upon the target of speech or on competing speech being di sseminated 
by others. Money i s  not the issue. The only time that the commercial 
purpose o f  particular speech matters i n  today' s  First Amendment 
223. 17 U.S.C. § I 07(3). 
224. See H arper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 4 71 U.S. 539,  564-66 ( 1 985). 
225. Compare Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 1 5  ( 1 97 1 )  with Smith v. California, 3 6 1  U .S. 1�7, 1 50 ( 1 959) (books) and Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U . S. 495, 50 I ( 1 95 2 )  (motion pictures). 
226. 1 7  u.s.c. § 1 07(4). 
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doctrine is when the speech is deemed t o  be "commercial speech."227 
As explained above in Part 1 1 . 8.2,  "commercial speech" as seen 
through a First Amendment lens is a narrow category that excludes 
many forms of profit-oriented speech.228 As with the previous factor, 
the analysis does not expressly encroach upon First Amendment 
values. The calculus in the fourth factor again demonstrates, however, 
that the current statutory fair use factors are not actually designed or 
tailored to accommodate F irst Amendment concerns in any particular 
way. 
B. The Supreme Court 's Fair Use Analysis 
The history of fair use through 1 976 and the foregoing analysis 
of the statutory factors demonstrate, and in some respects explain, the 
lack of express sensitivity to the First Amendment in the early 
doctrine and in the statute. The history and statutory language cannot, 
on the other hand, explain the Court's  continued reliance on section 
1 07 as a savior of free speech.229 The Court has not explained its 
reliance, either, although it has heard four cases including a 
significant fair use component since the 1 9 76 Act took effect.230 
Moreover, the Supreme Court's  judicial gloss on the speech­
insensitive fair use analysis only obliquely relates to modem First 
Amendment principles. 
l .  Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc. 
In Sony Corp. of A merica v. Universal City Studios, Jnc. ,23 1  the 
Court's first fair use decis ion,232 the parties disputed the fair or unfair 
nature of the use of video tape recorders by individuals to record 
copyright-protected televis ion shows for later viewing. The Court 
referred to this individual recording as "time-shifting."233 Although 
the Court would later "correct" lower court interpretation of Sony as 
227. See supra Part 1 1 .B.2.  
228. Id. 
229. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 1 87, 2 2 1  (2003); Harper & Row, 471 U.S.  at 560. 
230. See Campbell  v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 5 1 0  U.S. 569 ( 1 994); Stewart v. Abend, 495 
U.S. 207 ( 1 990); Harper & Row, 47 1 U.S. at 539; Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 
Inc., 464 U.S. 4 1 7  ( 1 984). 
23 1 .  Sony Corp. , 464 U.S. at 4 1 7 . 
232. The Court had heard two previous cases involving fair use, but each time the Court 
was equally divided and issued no opinion. See Will iams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 420 
U.S. 376 ( 1 975) (per curiam), aff'g by an equally divided Court 487 F.2d 1 345 (Ct. Cl .  1 973); 
Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Loew 's Inc., 356 U.S. 43 ( 1 958) (per curiam), aff'g by an equally 
divided Court Benny v. Loew's Inc., 239 F.2d 5 3 2  (9th Cir. 1 956). 
233. Sony Corp., 464 U.S.  at 42 1 .  
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providing for a presumption of unfair use when a defendant engaged 
in an allegedly infringing use for profit,234 a fair reading of the case 
does emphasize the commerciality, or profit-oriented nature of a 
use.235 The noncommercial nature o f  consumer time-shi fting favored 
Sony's fair use defense of the practice of time-sh ifting on both the 
first and fourth factors. 236 
W ith respect to the first fair use factor, the Court understood that 
the statutory language required consideration of the " ' commercial or 
nonprofit character of an activity, "' although the detennination on 
that point would not be conclusive.237 The Court then stated, 
If the Betamax [the video tape recorder in question] were used to 
make copies for a commercial or profit-making purpose, such use 
would presumptively be unfair. The contrary presumption is 
appropriate here, however, because the District Court ' s  findings 
plainly establish that time-shifting for private home use must be 
h . d . 1 fi . . 238 c aractenze as a noncommercia , nonpro 1t act1v1ty. 
The analysis of the first fair use factor ended there. The Court 
discussed no other aspect of the purpose and character of the use. 
With respect to the second factor, the Court without elaboration 
seemed to conclude that the nature of televised copyrighted 
audiovisual works favored fair use, despite the fact that those works 
can be either factual or fictional or anywhere in between.239 And 
although time-shifting involved the recording of entire works, the 
Court found that because the copyright owners allowed the initial 
viewing to occur free of charge, the third factor also did not weigh . f: . 240 against air use. As to the fourth factor, effect upon the market for 
or value of the work, the Court concluded that it did not prevent a 
finding of fair use because the p laintiff copyright o wners had not 
provided sufficient evidence to prove that time-shiftin g  was either 
234. See infra Part IV.8.4 
235. See Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 448-5 1 .  
236. Id. 
237. Id. at 448-49 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 94- 1 476 ( 1 976)). 
238. Id. at 449. 
239. Id. at 449-50: 
Moreover, when one considers the nature of a televised copyrighted audiovisual v.:ork, see 17 U.S.C. § 1 07(2) 0 982 ed.), and that t ime-shifting merely enables a viewer to see such a work which he had been invited to witness in its entirety free of charge, the fact that the entire work is reproduced, see § l 07(3), does not have its ordinary effect of militating against a finding of fair use. 
240. Id. 
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hannful at the time or would become harmful to the market for the 
works if it became more widespread. 24 1  
2 .  Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v .  Nation Enterprises 
In the Court's  next fair use case, Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. 
v. Nation Enterprises,242 analysis of the purpose and character of the 
alleged infringing use focused not only upon the commerciality of 
defendant's use, but also upon the defendant's "stated purpose of 
scooping" the upcoming publication of plaintiffs work and 
defendant's knowing exploitation of a "purloined manuscript."243 
Defendant Nation Enterprises published in The Nation Magazine 
qualitatively substantial excerpts from President Gerald Ford' s  soon­
to-be-published autobiography, focusing largely upon Ford's  pardon 
of President Richard Nix on. The facts that the autobiography had not 
yet been published and that The Nation had known its possession of 
the pre-publication manuscript was unauthorized both weighed 
heavi ly in  the Court's decision ruling against the claim of fair use.244 
The unpublished nature of the p laint i ff' s work weighed against fair 
use not only under the first factor, but also under the second. The 
Court held that "the scope of fair use is  narrower with respect to 
unpublished works . . . [because] [t]he right of first publication 
24 1 .  Id at 450-54. The Court expanded upon its view of the market-effects analysis as 
ollows: 
The purpose of copyright is to create incentives for creative effort. Even copying 
for noncommercial purposes may impair the copyright holder's ability to obtain 
the rewards that Congress intended him to have. But a use that has no 
demonstrable effect upon the potential market for, or the value of, the 
copyrighted work need not be prohibited in order to protect  the author's incentive 
to create. The prohibition of such noncommercial uses would merely inhibit 
access to ideas without any countervailing benefit. 
Thus, although every commercial use of copyrighted material is 
presumptively an unfair exploitation of the monopoly privilege that belongs to 
the owner o f  the copyright, noncommercial uses are a different matter. A 
challenge to a noncommercial use requires proof either that the particular use is 
harmful, or that if it should become widespread, it would adversely affect the 
potential market for the copyrighted work . . . . _ What i s  necessary is a showing 
by a preponderance of the evidence that some meaningfu l  likelihood of future 
harm exists. If the intended use is for commercial gain, that likelihood may be 
presumed. But if it  is for a noncommercial purpose, the likelihood must be 
demonstrated. 
Id. at 450-5 1 .  
242 .  Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v .  Nation Enters., 4 7 1  U.S. 539 ( 1 985). 
243. Id. at 562-63 .  
244. Id 
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encompasses not only the choice whether to publish at  all, but also t�c 
choices o f  when, where, and in what fonn first to publish a work. "24) 
I n  commenting upon the commercial or profit-oriented nature of 
the defendant ' s  use in its discussion of the first fair use factor, the 
Court repeated its statement from Sony that "every commercial use of 
copyrighted material is presumptively an unfair explo itation" of the 
copyright owner's rights.246 It fol lowed that general statement with 
this rationale: "The crux of the profit/nonprofit distinction is not 
whethe r  the sole motive of the use is monetary gain but whether the 
user stands to profit from explo itation of the copyrighted material 
without paying the customary price."247 In so doing, the Court appears 
to have b lended the first and fourth factors to some degree, without 
additional explanation. 
The Court acknowledged that another aspect of the purpose and 
character of the defendant's use was news reporting, but discounted 
that purpose on the basis that The Nation had not merely reported 
unprotected information and facts, but had instead made an 
unauthorized first publication o f  Ford ' s  copyrighted expression.248 
The distinction between the use of facts and the use of expression 
within the analysis of the purpose and character of the use echoes the 
Court's earlier discussion in the case of some aspects of the interplay 
of copyright and free speech.  The defendant had argued that First 
Amendment principles, namely the public interest in the content and 
manner of expression of Ford ' s  memoirs ,  mandated a decision on fair 
use opposite the Court' s  general view that, in almost a l l  instances, an 
"author' s  right to control the first public appearance of his 
undisseminated expression wil l  outweigh a claim of fair use. "249 In 
responding to this argument, the Court emphasized the role of the 
idea-expression distinction as the means within copyright of 
balancing free speech and an author ' s  exclusive righ ts. According to 
the Court, the defendant's theory would "expand fair  use to 
effectively destroy any expectation of copyright protection in the 
work of a public figure. "250 The court further stated: 
In view of the First Amendment protections already embodied 
in the Copyright Act's distinction between copyrightable 
245. Id. at 564. 
246. Id. at 562; Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 45 I .  
247. Harper & Row, 4 7 1  U.S. at 562. 
248. Id. at 56 1 .  
249. Id. at 555-56. 
250. Id. at 557. 
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expression and uncopyrightable facts and ideas, and the latitude for 
scholarship and comment traditionally afforded by fair use, we see 
no warrant for expanding the doctrine of fair use to create what 
amounts to a public figure exception to copyright.25 1 
While the Court did rely in part on "the latitude for scholarship 
and comment traditionally afforded by fair use," it relied primarily on 
the idea-expression distinction to deny further expansion of the scope 
of purpose and character of a use to accomplish a broader vision of 
the role of free speech within fair use. 252 This limited view of the free 
speech utility of fair use, considering primarily scholarship and 
comment as traditionally fair uses of express ion, devitalized the role 
of fair use as a protector of free speech. 
The Court rejected the notion that the content of the allegedly 
infringed work - subj ect matter of great public interest - should 
excuse an otherwise infringing use: "It is fundamentally at odds with 
the scheme of copyright to accord lesser rights in those works that are 
of greatest importance to the public. Such a notion ignores the maj or 
premise of copyright and injures author and public alike."253 In 
response to the Court's concern, I would argue that broadening the 
vision of purpose and character of a use to include considerations 
such as the value to the public of further dissemination of some 
expression need not fully excuse any particular use. That broader 
vision would only become one more factor in the overall  fair use 
balance. As the Court has repeatedly stated, no one factor is 
disposi ti ve. 254 
One difficulty in the Court's ability or desire to use Harper & 
Row as the vehicle to either affirm or recreate fair use as an 
embodiment of broad First Amendment values may have been that the 
defendant sought to excuse a qualitatively substantial use of 
expression, characterized by the District Court as "essentially the 
heart of the book. "255 The qualitative value of the expression used 
caused the third fair use factor to weigh heavily against a finding of 
fair use. Similarly, the fourth factor also powerfully favored the 
plaintiff. Having characterized the fourth factor as "undoubtedly the 
25 1 .  Id at 560. 
252. Id. at 557-60. 
253. Id. at 559. 
254. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 5 1 0  � .S. 569.' 577-78 ( 1 994); Harper & 
Row, 471 U.S. at 560; Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 4
1 7, 448 
( 1 984). 
255. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 5 5 7  F. Supp. 1 067, 1
072 (S.D.N.Y. 
1 983) (quoted in Harper & Row, 47 l U.S. at 565). 
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single most important element of fair use," the Court went on to 
emphasize the actual effect of The Nation ' s use upon the plaintiffs 
arrangement with Time Magazine for pre-publication serialization.�51' 
Referring to the article by defendant, Time had cance l led the 
serialization and refused to pay the full amount that would have been 
due to p l aintiff under the arrangement. According to the Court, this 
was "clear-cut evidence of actual damage" to the market for or value 
of the copyrighted work.257 As such, the Court stated that the burden 
shifted to defendant to rebut this prima facie case of damage. 
According to the Court, the defendant fai led to do so. 258 The last two 
factors in the fair use analysis weighed very heavily against fair use, 
perhaps so heavily that no showing on the other two factors could 
save the defense. Thus, it is l ittle wonder that the Court dec lined to 
effectuate the defendant's  proposed rul e  or excepti on, which was to 
allow free speech interests related to publishing information on public 
figures to override the "traditional" doctrine of fair use, rather than 
only to provide an interpretive guidepost. As put by the Court, 
"Congress has not designed, and we see no warrant for j udicially 
imposing, a 'compulsory license ' permitting unfettered access to the 
unpublished copyrighted expression of public figures."259 
3. Stewart v. Abend 
The Court's  third encounter with fair use, in Stewart v. A bend,260 
provided no reason to seriously consider free speech c oncerns within 
the first fair use factor or any other element of the fair use analysis. 
Abend owned by assignment the copyright in a short story, "It Had to 
Be Murder," during the renewal term of copyright.26 1  That story 
formed the basis of the movie "Rear Window." As an alternative 
argument to the primary issue of rights i n  a derivative work fol lowing 
expiration of a grant of rights to the pre-existing work, the distributors 
of the mo vie "Rear Window" argued that use of the sho rt story in the 
movie during the renewal term was a noninfringing fair use.262 At the 
256. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 566-67. 
257. Id. at 567. 
258. Id. at 567-69. 
259. id. at 569. 
260. Stewart v.  Abend, 495 U.S. 207 ( 1 990). 
26 1 .  id. at 2 1 2 .  
?62. id. at 236. The
. 
fair use claim in this case would certainly not have been accepted for review by the C�urt had it not been part of a case presenting an important issue upon which the circuits w�r� split: whether th
.
e owner of copyright i n  a derivative work infringed the rights in the pre-ex1stmg work by d1stnbutmg the derivative work during the renewal term of copyright, 
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Court of Appeals, the distributors claimed that the use was 
"educational" rather than "commerc ial" and thus should be 
considered fair, particularly with respect to the fi rst fair use factor.263 
Without support in the record for that claim, and with all three of the 
remaining factors weighing against a finding of fair use, the assertion 
of fair use failed miserably. Following its general explication of the 
parameters of fair use, including repeti tion of i ts  Sony statement about 
the impact of a commercial usc,264 the Court devoted few words to its 
analysis of fair use and easily dispensed with the issue. 
4. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose M usic,  Inc. 
In the most recent fair use decision by the Court, Campbell v. 
Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. ,265 the defendants, members of the rap group 2 
Live Crew, admitted to using some of the expression from the 
plaintiffs work, "Oh, Pretty Woman," in creating their new work, 
"Pretty Woman." The sole issue before the Supreme Court was fair 
use. In overturning the district court's grant of s ummary judgment to 
2 Live Crew finding fair use, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth 
Circuit emphasized the commercial nature of the use as weighing 
against two of the four fair use factors, citing the Sony decision on the 
first fair use factor and Harper & Row on the fourth factor.266 The 
Supreme Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings after 
resoundingly clarifying Sony: according to the Court, Sony did not 
call for a presumption against fair use in a case of  commercial use. 
Instead, Sony only included commerciality as one of many factors to 
be weighed in a fair use analysis: 267 
The Court of Appeals's elevation of one sentence from Sony to a 
per se rule thus runs as much counter to Sony itself as to the long 
common-law tradition of fair use adj udication. Rather, as we 
explained in Harper & Row, Sony stands for the proposition that 
the "fact that a publication was commercial as opposed to 
when the author and original assignor of rights to create the derivative work died before he was 
able to convey rights in the renewal term of the pre-existing work. 
263. Id. at 237.  
264. See id. ("The motion picture neither falls into any o f  the categories enume�ated in § 
107 nor meets the four criteria set forth in § 1 07. ' [E]very [unauthorized] commercial use of 
copyrighted material is presumptively an unfair exploitation of the mon?poly pri_
vilege �hat 
belongs to the owner of the copyright."' (quoting Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Stud10
s, 
lnc., 464 U.S. 4 1 7, 4 5 1  ( 1 984))). 
265. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 5 1 0  U.S. 569 ( 1 994). 
266. Id. at 573-74. 
267. id. at 584-85. 
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nonprofit is a separate factor that tends to weigh against a finding 
f f: 
. ,,268 o air use. 
While a finding of commercial use sti l l  creates a heavy burden 
for the defendant to overcome, it is no longer a death knel l  following 
the Court' s  "correction" of l ower courts' interpretation of its 
comment in Sony that commercial  uses are presumptively unfair uses. 
In Campbell, the Court was careful to note that while commerciality 
does weigh against a fair use, it i s  not dispositive and docs not create 
a presumption i n  a procedural sense.269 And in Camphell, despite not 
questioning whether 2 Live Crew' s  musical work was a use of a 
commercial  nature, the Court did recognize that commcrcial i ty - if 
made presumptively unfair and solely equated with pro fi t  - would 
swallow all of the often-fair purposes of a use listed in sect ion I 07. 
including comment, criticism, news reporting and the l i ke.no The 
Campbell Court even quoted Samuel Johnson : "No man but a 
blockhead ever wrote, except for money."27 1 So whi le  the Court 
acknowledged that making money is not really the issue in fair use, it 
did not ultimately redirect the attention of courts away from using a 
profit-nonprofit distinction within the first factor or otherwise reorient 
the commercial use issue within purpose and character o f  a use. The 
commercial nature of a use within the first factor is sti l l  j udged 
largely by the question of profit.272 
In Campbell the Court also emphasized that commcrc ial ity is not 
the only relevant characteristic bearing upon "purpose and character 
of the use." According to the Court, the "transformative" nature of a 
use has a significant role to play :  the more transformative a use, the 
less relevant other aspects of purpose and character o f  the use, 
including its commerciality.273 The Court construed the "purpose and 
character" of the allegedly infringing use as implicating two elements 
from Folsom :  "the nature and obj ects o f  the selections made" within 
268. ld. at 585 (quoting Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters 47 1 U S 539 
562 ( 1 985)). 
.. . . . 
269. Id. at 583-85.  
270. Id. at 584. 
27 1 .  Id. (�uoting 3 BOSWELL'S LIFE OF JOHNSON I 9 (G. Hill  ed. 1 934 )). 
272. In �icta, the Court did assert in Campbell that the use of a work .. to advertise a product, even m a parody, will be entitled to less indulgence under the first factor of the fair use enquiry t
.
han the sale of a parody for its own sake, let alone one perfonncd a single time by students m school." Id at 585 The C rt th b ti d 
. 
· 
· ou ere Y a u ed to a range of cornrncrcial ity. a range th
t
at
d
one
d 
mfi tght compare to commercial speech doctrine, but it did not actually set forth a�y s an ar or a lower court to apply F d .  · · · · 
. 
. 
. 
· or 1scuss1on of some 1mplicat10ns of using a range of commerc1ahty, see infra note 3 1 8. � 
273. Campbell, 5 1 0  U.S. at 579, 584-85 .  
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the allegedly infringing work and whether that work "supersede[s] the 
objects" of the original work.27-1 According to the Court, the thrust of 
the inquiry on the first factor is whether the al legedly infringing work 
"adds something new, with a further purpose or di fferent character, 
altering the first with new expression, meani ng, or message; it asks, in 
other words, whether and to what extent the new work is 
'tr � . "'275 Th C h . h 
. 
f ans1ormat1ve. e ourt states t at encouraging t e creation o 
transformative works, or at least al lowing the ir creation to potenti ally 
survive an infringement claim, furthers "the goal of copyright, to 
promote science and the arts. ,,;m, Because the Court thought the 2 
Live Crew song could reasonably be perceived to contain a parodic 
character, it reasonably could be classed as a transformative use : 
"Like less ostensibly humorous fonns of c riticism, [parody] can 
provide social benefit, by shedding li ght on an earlier work, and, in 
the process, creating a new one . "277 
Campbell's assessment of transformative uses focuses upon the 
value of those uses in pursuit of copyright ' s  internal constitutional 
goal. Campbell did not tie either transformative uses or copyright 's  
constitutional goal to the external question of First Amendment 
interests. At the same time, it did not state that only transformative 
works can claim to further the internal goal o f  copyright, and it did 
not foreclose consideration of First Amendment interests within the 
first fair use factor. By stating that transforrnative works "lie at the 
heart of the fair use doctrine's guarantee of breathing space within the 
confines of copyright,"278 the Court did not prec lude the possibil ity 
that other allegedly infringing works migh t  also lie within fair use' s 
"breathing space," or even at its heart. 
5. Postscript: Eldred v. Ashcroft 
Only one o f  the Court's four fair use cases, Harper & Row, 
decided in 1 985, included any discussion of the First Amendment.279 
More recently, the Court explicitly tied free speech to fair use in 
another copyright case, the Eldred decis ion of 2003.280 Eldred did not 
include any substantive analysis of fair use; i t  was not a fair use case. 
274. Id. at 578-79 (quoting Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 348 (C.C.D. Mass. 1 84 1 )  (No. 
4,901 )). 
275. Id. at 579. 
276. Id. 
277. Id. 
278. Id. 
279. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 47 1 U.S. 539, 560 ( 1 985). 
280. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 1 87, 22 1 (2003). 
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The Court relied on the existence of the fair use doctrine in 
responding to the plaintiff-petitioner ' s  claim that the Copyright Tenn 
Extension Act of 1 998 should be s ubj ect to direct First Amendment 
scrutiny.28 1 The only authority c ited in Eldred for re ly ing on fair use 
to dismiss the request for First Amendment scrutiny was 1-fwper & 
Row,282 and the Court did not further expand on i ts reasoning. 
C. Fair Use in the Lower Courts 
W i th the insensitive fair use factors and no real free speech gloss 
from the Supreme Court to guide them, it is no wonder that the lower 
courts rare ly balance free speech interests with copyright interests 
when applying the fair use defense. 283 The only real cons istency in the 
as-yet- l imited judicial treatment of First Amendment claims within 
copyright' s  fair use doctrine i s  the courts' reliance upon the first 
factor, the purpose and character of the use, as the pri mary factor 
accommodating free speech-related concems.284 Wh i l e  this might be 
appropriate in the abstract, at this time the approach is problematic as 
a practi cal matter. As discussed above, the current language and 
current interpretation of the first fair use factor do not l end themselves 
to sensitive accommodation of F irst A mendment concerns. 
Following Campbell, lower courts transitioned from the post-
1 976 v i ew of the first factor as almost exclusively a 
commercial/noncommercial question (or commercial/nonprofit 
educational question) to a binary inquiry into both commerciality and 
28 1 .  See id. at 2 1 8-22. 
282. See id. at 2 1 9. 
283. In order to reach a consciously free-speech-sensitive result, it might be argued that 
courts would be required to stretch the more standard concepts of fair use even while ostensibly 
applying the doctrine in a faithful manner. See, e.g . . R osemont Enters .. Inc . v. Random House. 
Inc., 366 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1 966); Time, Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assocs .. 293 F. Supp. 1 3 0 
(S.D.N.Y. 1 968). See also Nimmer, supra note 6 (supporting the absence of First Amendment 
considerations within fair use but arguing for limited First Amendment considerations within 
copyright doctrine as a whole). 
284. See, e.g., Rosemont, 366 F.2d 303; Bernard Geis, 293 F. Supp. 1 3 0.  See also Suntrust 
Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1 257, 1 264 ( 1 1 th Cir. 200 I )  (considering the 
intersection of copyright and free speech before applying the four fair use factors and focusing 
up�n transformation and market harm when concluding that the defendant would l ikely succeed 
m its fair use defense); Consumers Union of the U.S.,  Inc. v. Gen. Signal Corp., 724 F.2d I 044, 
1 049 (2d Cir. 1 983); Harper & Row, Publ ishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters .. 723 F . 2d 1 95, 206-08 
(2d Cir. 1 98 3 )  (focusing upon the news reporting purpose of the use), rev 'd, 47 1 U.S.  539 
( 1 985). Cf Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 539 (discussing the defendant's asserted First 
Amendment "public figure" defense in the context of the first and second factors but ultimately 
denying. the defense). See also Patry & Perlmutter, supra note 1 99, at 6 8 5  (arguing that in appropnate circumstances, courts may consider the First Amendment within purpose and 
character of the use, citing as authority both Rosemont and Bernard Geis). 
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transfonnation.285 While some courts have smce 1 976 expressly 
considered other elements within "purpose and character of the 
,,2s6 l l . use, many or even most current y ana yze only commercial use 
and transfonnative use.287 Neither sub-factor prompts courts to 
consider the First Amendment in any depth. 
In connection with this article, I performed a comprehensive 
survey of all district and appellate court deci sions that include any 
discussion of the meaning of commercial use within section 1 07 .  
There are more than 200 such cases, yet they contain very little 
judicial analysis of the meaning or relevance of commercial use. The 
285. Unfortunately, some decisions still focus upon commercial use alone, even after the 
Coun's statement in Camphell that commercial use does not c reate a presumption against fair 
use. See, e.g., Lamb v. Starks, 949 F. Supp. 753 (N.D. Cal. 1 996); !tar-Tass Russian News 
Agency v. Russian Kurier, Inc., 886 F. Supp. 1 1 20 (S.D.N.Y. 1 995); Robinson v. Random 
House, Inc., 877 F. Supp. 830 (S.D.N.Y. 1 995). 
286. Courts that include considerations other than commercial and transformative use 
within the first factor, purpose and character of a use, most o ften look at bad faith. See, e.g., 
Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 255-56 (2d Cir. 2006) (failing to seek permission for a use is 
not in itself evidence of bad faith); NXIVM Corp. v. Ross Inst., 364 F.3d 47 1 ,  478 (2d Cir. 
2004) (breaching a confidentiality agreement in connection with the alleged infringement is 
evidence of bad faith); Nunez v. Caribbean Int') News Corp., 235 F.3d I 8, 22 (I st Cir. 2000) 
(considering good faith as well as commercial use and transformation of the original works into 
news, i.e. , the original photographs themselves were part of th e controversy being covered by 
the news story in which the photographs were reproduced); Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 30 1 ,  309 
(2d Cir. 1992) (removing the copyright symbol from the original work is evidence of bad faith); 
Weissman v. Freeman, 868 F.2d 1 3 1 3, 1 324 (2d Cir. 1 989) (deleting plaintiff author's name and 
substituting defendant's name damages the defendant's ability to utilize the equitable defense of 
fair use); Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Moral Majority, Inc., 796 F.2d 1 1 48, 1 1 53 (9th Cir. 1 986) 
(copying the copyrighted work in order to respond to and comment upon a personal attack made 
in that copyrighted work weighs in favor of defendant within purpose and character of a use); 
Harper & Row, 47 1 U.S. at 562 (copying from a purloined manuscript indicates bad faith). See 
also Marcus v. Rowley, 695 F.2d 1 1 7 1 ,  1 1 75-76 (9th Cir. 1 983) (finding impropriety in 
defendant's conduct because defendant had not sought permission and had copied the original 
work without providing credit to the original source). 
287. See, e.g., Video Pipeline, Inc. v. Buena Vista Home Entm't, Inc., 342 F.3d 1 9 1 ,  1 98-
200 (3rd Cir. 2003); Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 800-03 (9th Cir. 
2003); Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F .3 d  1 25 7 ,  1 269 (I I th Cir. 200 1 ); Infinity 
Broad. Corp. v. Kirkwood, 1 50 F.3d 104, 1 07-09 (2d Cir. 1 998); Los Angeles News Serv. v. 
Reuters Television Int' I,  Ltd., 1 49 F.3d 987, 993-94 (9th Cir. 1 998); Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v .  
Penguin Books USA, Inc., 1 09 F.3d 1 394, 1401 (9th Cir.  1 997); Toho Co. v. Wil l iam Morrow 
and Co., 33 F. Supp. 2d 1 206, 1 2 1 6- 1 7  (C.D. Cal. 1 998); Storm I mpact. Inc. v. Software of the 
Month Club, 1 3  F. Supp. 2d 782, 787-88 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (utilizing only transf�rma�1ve and 
profit/non-profit use in its analysis despite characterizing the purpose and character mqmry as an 
examination of "whether the particular use made of copyrighted material was necessary_ 
to the 
assened purpose" and "whether the defendant reproduced the copyright owner's express�on f�r 
the purpose of marketing the precise form of that expression or for the purpose of making his 
own additional statement."). But see Blanch, 467 F.3d at 2 5 1 -56 (considering the elements of 
transformation, commercial use, and bad faith, as well as a fourth category of parody, satire and 
justification for the copying). 
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decisions focus primarily on a defendant's pursuit of commercial 
gain, or profit. 288 Some decisions broaden the category even further, 
holding that, for example, a use can be for profit, and thus disfavored, 
even i n  the largely unremunerative world of academ ia, because a 
defendant can benefit personally or professionally from copying 
despite the l ack of a monetary gain.289 The vast majority of lower 
court decis ions on the first factor do not indicate that courts attempt to 
consider the overall relevance of c ommercial use to the fair use 
inquiry or any variability within the c ategory of commercial uses. �90 
When a use i s  for a commercial purpose, the courts weigh that fact 
against fair use (after Campbell, this weight is l ighter w hen the use is 
288. The cases after Campbell do provide a more nuanced analysis than prior cases. but 
the majority of the newer cases still consider the distinction a dichotomous one - commercial or 
noncommercial use - with nothing in between. The effect of Campbell is largely in the weight 
placed upon a finding of commercial use i n  cases where the use was also transformativc. 
289. See, e.g., Weissmann v. Freeman, 868 F.2d 1 3 1 3 ,  1 3 24 (2d Cir. 1 989). 
290. See, e.g., Video Pipeline, 342 F.3d at 1 98-200 (limiting discussion o f  commercial use 
in the first factor to the finding that the use was commercial because the defendant charged a fee 
for its service); Mattel, 353 F.3d at 803 (finding that the defendant artist engaged in a 
commercial use because he "had a commercial expectation and presumably hoped to find a 
market for his art," but also determining that the transformative nature of the use outweighed its 
commerc ial purpose); Suntrust Bank, 268 F.3d at 1 269 (characterizing the allegedly in fringing 
work as "undoubtedly a commercial product" because it was published for profit, without any 
further analysis of commerciality, despite the fact that the work criticized the original. 
particularly the race relations depicted therein); Los A ngeles News Serv. , 1 49 F .3d at 994 (not 
distinguishing between commercial news reportin g  and other commercial purposes in 
considering the first fair use factor); UMG Recordings, Inc. v. M P3.com, Inc.,  92 F. Supp. 2d 
349, 35 1 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (characterizing defendant's use as highly commercial, although it was 
a free service, because defendant sought to make a profit by other means); Toho Cu., 33 F. 
Supp. 2d at 1 2 1 7  (concluding without analysis that a book was a "purely com mercial use"). But 
see Blanch, 467 F.3d at 254: 
It can hardly be said . . .  that the defendants' economic gains from (the 
accused work) were 'to the exclusion of broader public benefits."" 
Notwithstanding the fact that artists are sometimes paid and museums sometimes 
earn money, the public exhibition of art is widely and we think properly 
considered to "have value that benefits the broader public interest." 
(citations omitted); Nunez, 235 F.3d at 22: 
For a commercial use to weigh heavily against a finding of fair use, it must 
involve more than simply publication in a profit-making venture. . . . We 
agree . . . that the commercial use here, however, constitutes more than mere 
reproduction for a profitable use. The photographs were used in part to create an 
enticing lead page that would prompt readers to purchase the newspaper. Thus El 
Vocero used the photograph not only as an ordinary part of a profit-making 
venture, but with emphasis in an attempt to increase its revenue. 
See also Higgins v. Detroit Educ. Television Found., 4 F. Supp. 2d 70 1 ,  705 (E.D. Mich. 1 998) 
(noting that "[t)he fact that a charge. is made for a work, or that a profit is anticipated . . .  does not convert the use mto a commercial one . . . .  'The commercial nature of a use is a matter of 
degree, not an absolute . . . .  "' (quoting Maxtone-Graham v. Burtchaell 803 F 2 d  1 253 1 262 
(2d Cir. 1 986)). ' . ' 
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also transformative), and then the courts move on without further 
discussion.291 
Since Campbell, most courts have begun to analyze uses for the 
presence or absence of a transformative character. They seem most 
comfortable with finding a transformative, and thus a fair-use­
favorable, use when the use is also negatively critical of the original 
work.292 The courts do not, by and l arge, inquire as to the relationship 
of the specific use in question to either copyright interests or First 
Amendment interests.293 If any rationale is provided for the court's 
29 1 .  See, e.g., Video Pipeline, 342 F.3d at 1 9 8-200; Suntrust Bank, 268 F.3d at 1 269; 
Castle Rock Entm 't, Inc. v. Carol Publ'g Group, Inc., 1 50 F .3d 1 3 2, 1 4 1 -42 (2d Cir. 1 998); Los 
Angeles News Serv. , 1 49 F.3d at 994; Dr. Seuss, 1 09 F.3d at 1 40 1 .  But see Blanch, 467 F.3d at 
253-54 (explaining that because transformative works are less l i kely to be market substitutes for 
the original work, the commercialism of a transformative use i s  less significant to the fair use 
analysis); Mattel, 353 F.3d at 803 (the commercialism of a transformative use is less significant 
to the fair use analysis). 
292. See Suntrust Bank, 268 F .3d at 1 270 (emphasizing, throughout the discussion of 
transfonnation, the fact that the new work criticized the original work: "(The new work] is more 
than an abstract, pure fictional work. It is principally and purposefully a critical statement that 
seeks to rebut and destroy the perspective, judgments, and mythology of [the original]."); Dr. 
Seuss, 109 F.3d at 1 400-01 (considering only parody targeting the original work, and not satire, 
to be the type of transformative work favoring fair use). But see Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 
F.3d 8 1 1 ,  8 1 9  (9th Cir.  2003) (finding a trans format ive use where the allegedly infringing use 
served a different function and purpose than the original work). 
293. In reviewing recent case law, I found but a few examples of courts going beyond the 
details of the fair use "test" to include consideration of the relationship of the specific use to the 
broader purposes of copyright. Most courts simply walked mechanically through the fair use 
factors. Decisions in which courts did go beyond the details of the fair use factors to include 
broader interests generally did so by referring to the "public interest" underlying copyright law. 
See. e.g., Perfect 1 0, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 487 F.3d 70 1 ,  722 (9th Cir. 2007) (analyzing 
purpose and character of a use with reference to the purposes of copyright, noting that the 
Supreme Court "has directed us to be mindful of the extent to which a use promotes the 
purposes of copyright and serves the interest of the public"); Blanch, 467 F.3d at 254: 
It can hardly be said . . . that the defendants' economic gains from [the accused 
work] were "to the exclusion of broader public benefits." Notwithstanding the 
fact that artists are sometimes paid and museums sometimes earn money, the 
public exhibition of art is  widely and we think properly considered to "have value 
that benefits the broader public interest." 
(citations omitted). See also Kelly, 336 F.3d at 820 (considering, within purpose and character of 
the use, the court's j udgment that the use of the copyright owner's work "promotes the goals of 
the Copyright Act and the fair use exception. The (use does] not stifle artistic creativity 
because . . .  [it does] not supplant the need for the originals. In addition, [the use) benefit[s] t�e 
public by enhancing information-gathering techniques on the i nternet."); Castle Rock Entm t, 
150 FJd at 1 4 1  (tying fair use analysis to the Copyright Clause but not to the First Ame�dment: 
"The ultimate test of fair use . . .  is whether the copyright law's goal of 'promot[mg] the 
Progress of Science and useful Arts,' U.S. Const., art. I, § 8, c l .  8, 'would be better served by 
allowing the use than by preventing it. "' (quoting Arica Inst., Inc. v. Palm_
er, 970 F.2d 1 06?, 
1 077 (2d Cir. 1 992)). I found only one case that explicitly utilized the First Amendment m 
ruling/or an infringement defendant on the issue of fair use. See infra note 295. 
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analysis or the value of transformation, it is generally only a 
repetiti;n o f  language from Campbell. 294 While exceptions t� this 
general pattern exist, only one recent fair use decision has credited a 
defendant's assertion of First Amendment rights and has been based 
on a balancing of the public benefits or interests promoted by the 
varied purposes of copyright and the First Amendment.295 
V. REINTERPRETING AND REVISING FAIR USE TO BETTER PROTECT 
FREE SPEECH 
The language of the fair use statute provides little guidance for. 
and also little express restraint on, a court 's  application of fair use to 
vindicate or deny relief to an asserted free speech interest. The 1 i stcd 
294. See, e.g. , Suntrust Bank, 268 F .3d at 1 269-7 1 .  
295. See id. at 1 257. In Suntrust, the Eleventh Circuit included First Amen<lmcnt 
considerations in its analysis of a preliminary injunction that had been granted to restrain 
publication of a novel al leged to infringe on the copyright in Margaret M itchel l ' s  hook Cione 
with the Wind. Id. at 1 265. The novel was defended as a parody that criticized Gone with 1he 
Wind, particularly the race relations depicted therein. Id. at 1270. The primary link noted hy the 
court between fair use and the First Amendment was the fact that some criticism and comment 
can be protected via fair use. Id. at 1 265 ("[T)he narrower quest ion in this case is to what extent 
a critic may use the protected elements of an original work of authorship to communicate her 
criticism without infringing the copyright in that work. . . .  (T]his becomes essentially an 
analysis of the fair use factors."). But while Suntrust has been hailed as a case giving more 
positive attention to First Amendment interests than any other recent copyright case. the court 
did little to advance critical analysis of the relationship of fair use to free speech. The court 
limited its analysis of speech interests to the idea-expression dichotomy and the fair  use defense. 
Id. at 1 264-65. It also made the unsupported, broad assertion that "First Amendment privi leges 
are [ ) preserved through the doctrine of fair use. Until  codification of the fair-use doctrine in the 
1 976 Act, fair use was a judge-made right developed to preserve the constitutionaliti· ol 
copyright legislation by protecting First A mendment values." Id. at 1 264 (emphasis added ) . 
Given current application of the fair use factors (detailed in other portions of this article). by 
continuing to rely on fair use as it currently exists, these statements hurt rather than help future 
defendants' attempts to use fair use to vindicate speech interests. And in the end. the court" s  
decision to vacate the preliminary injunction d i d  not arise from an expressly speech-sensitive 
application of fair use. Instead, its decision was based on the court's balancing of the irreparable 
harm an� public interest factors within analysis of the propriety of a preliminary injunction. as 
well as its assessment that the fair use defense was viable under Camphell's treatment of 
parodies. 
In this case, we have found that to the extent Suntrust suffers injury from [the 
parodic novel's) putative infringement of its copyright in (Gone with the Wind]. 
such harm can adequately be remedied through an award of monetary damages. Moreover, under the present state of the record, it  appears that a viable fair use defense is  available. Thus, the issuance of the injunction was at odds with the share� principles of the First Amendment and the copyright law, acting as a prior rest�amt on s�eech because the public had not had access to (defendant's) ideas or v1ewpomt m the form of expression that she chose. 
Id. at 1 277. 
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factors are non-exclusivc,296 despite a j udicial history since 1 976 
indicating otherwise. As such, a court could choose to consider First 
Amendment values outside of the listed factors. But there is also room 
for the First Amendment within the standard four factors. Slight 
adjustments to the courts ' approach to the factors would be needed, to 
be sure, but those adjustments do not pose an insurmountable hurdle. 
The plain language of section I 07 tells us that the purpose and 
character of a use is much wider than considerations of commercial 
nature and nonprofit educational purposes - and not just because 
those considerations arc part of a dependent "including" clause that 
could "swallow" the i l lustrative uses also provided in section I 07 . 297 
The commercial nature of a use cannot be interpreted as the opposite 
of a nonprofit educational purpose, as the two are simply not 
opposites. Moreover, as set forth in Part 1 1 1 .D.  above, the legislative 
history of the "commercial" use language is virtually non-existent, 
indicating only that it was added to placate the education lobby rather 
than to vindicate a significant policy interest.298 Analysis of the 
purpose and character of a use should not be constrained by the 
additional language related to the commercial nature of a use. 
And while the Court in Campbell moved lower courts away from 
a myopic view of the purpose and character of a use as being a simple 
question of profit motive, its emphasis on "transformative" use has 
introduced another form of myopia that threatens the viability of fair 
use as a protector of free speech. A broader vision of the purpose and 
character of a use, one which respects Campbell but treats its 
emphasis on transformative use as only one facet of the inquiry, 
would do much to invigorate fair use with free speech sensitivity. 
A. Expanding Purpose and Character Beyond "Transformative " 
Uses 
The Supreme Court's guidance i n  C ampbell has created its own 
potential confl ict  between the First Amendment and fair use. With the 
current emphasis on transformative uses, allegations of fair use via 
reproduction, rather than transformation, immediately lose the first 
element of the fair use battle, regardless of the contribution of those 
reproductions to public discourse or other beneficial purpose. As 
Rebecca Tushnet recently argued, free speech values may be 
promoted via reproduction of works just as those values may be 
296. 17 U.S.C.  § I 07 (2000). 
297. See supra note 24 for the full text of section 1 07. See also supra Part IV.B.4. 
298. See supra Part Ill .D. 
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advanced via transformation o f  works.299 She discusses the value of  
copying and dissemination to  audiences, an 
.
acccs� and public_ discourse value, as well the value to speakers, mcludmg values of 
self-expression, persuasion, and affirmation, all of which fa ll within 
the self-realization interest promoted through protection of core 
speech. None of those values inheres only in transformation or 
original speech. Even Melville N immer, the ultimate progen itor of the 
Court's assertion that copyright ' s  internal safeguards prevent a clash 
with free speech,300 clearly articulated the important point that free 
speech need not be original in order to be protected.30 1 The Court 
itself implicitly recognized thi s  issue in Cohen v. Ca/ijiJrnia when i t  
protected the relatively inarticulate, and likely unorig i nal, statement 
on Cohen's jacket. 302 
Although in Campbell the Court emphasized the value of a 
transfonnative use in supporting copyright's internal purpose of 
promoting science and the arts, it did not foreclose the breadth of the 
"breathing space" guaranteed within fair use.303 Nor did the Court say 
that the transformative nature o f  a use was the ultimate question under 
the first factor. Rather, the Court high l ighted transforrnative uses as a 
category potentially invested with a p ub l ic benefit. 
If the emphasis on "transformative" uses in Campbell is viewed 
as a proxy for a wider public interest inquiry, rather than a category to 
299. Rebecca Tushnet, Copy This Essay: How Fair Use Doctrine Harms Free Speech and 
How Copying Serves It, 1 14 YALE L. J. 535, 562-82 (2004); Yolokh, supra note 6. at 725-27. 
See also Laura G. Lape, Transforming Fair Use: The Productive Use Factor in Fair Use 
Doctrine, 58 ALB. L. REV. 677, 7 1 3  ( 1 995) ("The productive use doctrine, by discounting the 
benefits of access, and refusing to weigh them along with the benefits of creation, unnecessarily 
narrows the focus of inquiry under the first factor of section I OT'). 
300. See Netanel, supra note 6, at 7- 1 2 . 
30 1 .  See, e.g., ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 685-86 (Leonard w. 
Levy et al. eds., 1 986) (including an entry on copyright, written by Mel Nimmer. wherein 
Nimmer agreed that there was a conflict between the First Amendment and the copyright laws, 
due m part to the fact that "(n]othing in the First A mendment limits the freedom protected 
t�ereun�er to speec� that is original with the speaker," but wherein he also pointed to the 
d1stmct1on between ideas and expression within copyright as the means by which the conflict is 
resolved, claiming tha� "' ideas' lie in the domain of the First Amendment, so that copyright may 
not be claimed therem, but that the form of 'expression' of ideas may be the subject of 
copyright, notwithstanding the First Amendment."). 
302: See .Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 1 5  ( 1 9 7 1  ). Similarly, when the N. Y. Times wished to
. 
reprint portions o� the "Pentagon Papers," the fact that the works were not original to the 
Times did not factor mto the Co�rt's decision on First Amendment grounds, and neither did the 
fact that the author of those written works (the government) objected to their publication. See N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 7 1 3  ( 1 97 1  ) . Accord Tushnet, supra note 299. at 563-64; McJohn, supra note 8 1 ,  at 1 09. 
303. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose, Inc., 5 1 0  U.S.  569, 579 ( 1 994). See supra text accompanying notes 276-278. 
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be pursued for its own sake, the broadening o f  the first factor would 
create a window through which fair use could truly protect free 
speech. The Eldred opinion instructs courts to construe copyright's  
internal safeguards to accommodate First Amendment concems.304 A 
broader interpretation o f  Camphel/ that looks at "transformation" as 
an example of a public benefit, not a stand-alone inquiry, would help 
courts do just that. 
Public benefit via speech creation and dissemination spans a 
broader reach than transformative uses only. Mere reproduction and 
dissemination can create public bene fit not otherwise created by the 
original work, such as in the case of (future Senator) Allan Cranston' s  
preparation and distribution of a translation o f  Adolf Hitler' s  Mein 
Kampf Cranston's purpose - certainly beneficial to the public - was 
to combat the effect of the selectively edited, and misleading, 
translation officially available in the United States through Hitler 's  
publisher.305 Cranston lost the copyright infringement case brought by 
Hitler's publisher in 1 939.306 Under the fair use analysis app lied by 
many courts today, he would likely lose again because his use would 
be classified as both commercial and, more damning, non­
transformative. A better analysis is warranted. Were a similar 
situation to arise today, someone in Cranston's position would have 
no confidence that the First Amendment would even be considered in 
connection with a defense to copyright infringement. 
If my argument is accepted and Campbell 's "transformati ve" use 
is read as a proxy for a broader vision of uses imbued with public 
benefit, which would allow fair use to perform a First Amendment 
purpose, the result would likely be different. The first factor of 
purpose and character would favor Cranston, even though the use was 
a reproduction rather than a transformation. The public benefit 
provided by an accurate translation of portions of Hitler's book that 
were edited from the A merican edition, specifically portions related to 
Hitler's plan for the world, would fulfill the First Amendment 
purpose of dissemination of information and expression that can assist 
304. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. t 87, 22 1 n.24 (2003) ("[l]t is appropriate to construe 
copyright's internal safeguards to accommodate First Amendment concerns."). The .
court cit
,
:d 
as authority United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc. , 5 1 3  U.S. 64, 78 ( 1 994), where 1t stated: It 
is . . .  incumbent upon us to read the statute to eliminate [serious constitutional] doubts so long 
as such a reading is not plainly contrary to the intent of Congress." 
305. See Anthony o. Miller, Court Halted Dime Edition of 'Mein Kampf'; Cranston Tells 
How Hitler Sued Him and Won, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 1 4 ,  1 988, at 4.  
306. See Houghton Mifflin Co. v. Noram Publ'g Co., Inc., 28 F. Supp. 676 (S.D.N
.Y. 
1939). 
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the public in its evaluation of governmental policy. And as I ar�ue 
below, the commercial sale of the translation should not factor mto 
purpose and character of the use, and should instead be reserved for 
the fourth factor. 
The second factor, nature of the copyrighted work, would likely 
favor the publisher. The third factor, amount and substantiality of the 
portion used, might still favor infringement rather than fair use, since 
the copying would be both quantitatively and qualitatively substantial. 
On the other hand, a court's  consideration of the public interest in 
dissemination of Hitler's actual p l ans for European and world 
domination, including the powerful effect of hearing about those 
plans in his own words, would help  mitigate any damage this factor 
would do to Cranston's fair use defense, since significant copying 
would be necessary to accomplish the valuable purpose of the use. 
The fourth factor, market effects, might stil l  favor the publisher. But 
given that Cranston's translation focused on the aggressive, power­
hungry side of Hitler's vision for the world as expressed in Mein 
Kampf, which was missing from the o fficial version available from 
Hitler's publisher, analysis of the likely effect on the market for the 
official version might have instead resulted in the fourth factor's 
being neutral ,  or at least only slightly damaging to Cranston.307 And 
even though Cranston's book was sold rather than given away, the 
fourth factor might still be neutral because Cranston' s  translation was 
not a real substitute for the official v ersion. 
Altogether, consideration of a broad public interest in the first 
factor, including speech interests, would give Cranston a fighting 
chance of succeeding in his fair u s e  defense. But if the first factor 
remains limited to transformative uses and commercial purposes, 
speech interests such as those rais e d  in the Cranston-Mein Kampf 
situation are unlikely to be considered within fair use. 
B. Eliminating Commerciality from the Purpose and Character 
Inquiry 
The continued emphasis on commercial use within a doctrine 
ostensibly sensitive to free speech concerns means that the courts' 
defi.n�tion of commercial use retains vital importance. I n  its fair use dec1s1ons, the Supreme Court's guidance has been l imited. In both 
Sony and Harper & Row, commerci a l  use was characterized as being 
307. See Miller, supra note 305. 
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opposed to non-profit use.308 In Harper & Row the Court went even 
further, stating that benefiting from copyrighted material "without 
paying the customary price" meant a commercial use.309 That 
definition could easily include noncommercial, nonprofit uses. 
Moreover, the reasoning is circular: if the use is  fair, then there is  no 
infringement and no need for authorization or a fee - there is no 
customary price for a fair use. Even Campbell, which criticized the 
appellate court 's  analysis of commercial use, did little to refine the 
analysis.3 10 
This leaves the commercial use inquiry in the first factor directly 
in conflict with the Court's First Amendment instruction as to the 
appropriate categorization of speech when preparing to apply greater 
or lesser protection to types of speech .  As outl ined in Part II .8.2 
above, speech does not lose core First Amendment protection due to a 
profit motive or other commercial connection, such as paid 
placement.3 1 1 The lower protection afforded to commercial  speech 
arises only when the speech does no more than propose a commercial 
transaction or evinces a thoroughly commercial character through an 
aggregation of elements, including format, content, and purpose.3 1 2 
By disfavoring commercial uses on the basis o f  a profit motive or 
other economic purpose, current fai r  use analysis discriminates 
against core speech simply because the speaker disseminated the 
speech for the speaker' s  own benefit. 
In addition to the categorical clash above, as well as the conflict 
of the profit-nonprofit analysis with many of the "more fair" types of 
uses such as criticism and reporting, the continued emphasis on 
commercial or profit-based uses duplicates the concern of the fourth 
factor, market effects. When a use is deemed to be of a commercial 
nature due to its fai lure to pay a license fee3 1 3 or its presence in a 
commercial market in competition with the original work, those 
considerations really do not address "purpose and character." Instead, 
they address the market for or value of the copyrighted work. When a 
use is commercial because it affects copyright's utilitarian, incentive­
based structure, the use implicates the copyright owner's interest i n  
the market fo r  o r  value of the work. T h e  fourth factor i s  explicitly 
308. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,  464 U.S. 4 1 7, 449 ( 1 984); Harper 
& Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 562 (J 985) . 
309. Harper & Row, 47 1 U.S. at 562. 
3 1 0. See supra notes 267-272 and accompanying text. 
3 1 1 . See supra Part 11.B.2. 
3 1 2. Id. 
3 13. See Harper & Row, 47 1 U.S. at 562. 
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concerned with the effect of the use on the market for, an d value o C  
the plaintiff's work.314 Market effects should not be d ou ble-c ounted 
through the first factor. An d when courts do consider "commercial 
nature" so broadly in the first factor as to engulf all for-profit 
enterprise the commercial nature of a use bears a heavy burden on a 
defendant
, 
i n  two of the four factors. This skews a c ourt's  an alysis.·� 1 5  
As an example, consider Harper & Row. The c as e  might come 
out the s ame way even after eliminating the commcrc ial­
nonc ommercial use distinction. But the First Amen dment interest in 
news reporting an d information dissemination would have received 
more attention if The Nation 's  profit-oriented status had n ot been used 
as one "strike" against fair use, with the derivative market c ounted as 
an additional "strike."3 1 6  The First Amendment interest could have 
been consi dered head-on if the article's clear n ews-reporting, 
noncommercial speech status had been accounted for an d if the 
article's profit-making status had not been turned against i t. I do not 
argue that the result in this particular case would n ecessarily have 
been different un der my proposed analysis.3 1 7  That result would 
simply have been more defe ns i bl e  wi thin a balancing of First 
Amen dment and copyri ght inter ests. Just as not all n ews reporting 
escapes libel law, not all news reporting wi ll escape copyri ght law. 
We should, however, remain sensitive to the First A m en dment in each 
analysis. 
To further revise an d apply the fair use doctrin e  today to 
improve the protection of freedom of speech in coordin ati on with fair 
3 1 4. 1 7  U .S.C. § 1 07(4) (2000) ("the effect o f  the use upon the potential market for or 
value of the copyrighted work"). 
3 1 5 .  See William W. Fisher Ill, Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine, 1 0 1  HARV. L. REV. 
1659, 1 672-73 ( 1 988) (referring to this phenomenon as "double-counting"); see also Jay Dratler, 
Jr., Distilling the Witches ' Brew of Fair Use in Copyright Law, 43 U. MIAMI L. REV. 233.  302 
( 1988) ("Allowing market considerations to dominate the 'purpose' factor, as well as the critical 
'market effect' factor might give them more weight than Congress actually intended."). Laura 
Lape argue� that even after the �ourt refocused attention in the first fair use factor, emphasizing 
transformat1ve uses, the balance 1s stil l  skewed: 
[t]o fae :xtent that productive use is equated with non-superseding use, 
cons1de�atton of productive use under the first factor permits the fourth factor, 
market impact, to be counted twice . . . .  This i s  the case because a superseding 
use - a use that replaces the copyrighted work in the marketplace - is  precisely 
what satisfies the fourth factor. 
Lape, supra note 299, at 7 1 5 . 
3 1 6. See Harper & Row, 47 1 U.S. at 566-67. 
3 1 7 .  The effect o n  the market for serialization rights o f  Ford's memoir was l i kely s o  great 
the use of the "h rt" f th k · ' . . ea o e wor might have been so significant, and the fact that the publication was
. 
pu'."Jlosely timed to scoop the previously unpublished work and article might have been so UnJusttfied - that all might have coalesced to reach the same result. 
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use's role in carrying out the constitutional aim of copyright, 
Congress should eliminate the commerciality of a use from the 
purpose and character inquiry. Specifically, Congress should delete 
from the first fair use factor the express inclusion of "whether such 
use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational 
purposes." The language, as applied by the courts, skews the fair use 
analysis away from the more core questions of public benefit and true 
market harm to the plaintiff. m Moreover, it is not consistently 
31 8. Even without Congressional action, the Court could choose to redefine the 
"commercial" nature of a use within the first factor to create the other end of the spectrum from 
"nonprofit educational" use. This would move lower courts further in the direction begun by 
Campbell by making the commerciality of a use an even less influential factor in most cases. 
Accord Tushnet, supra note 6, at 70-74. By creating a spectrum of uses, the Court would 
eliminate the illogical contraposition of commercial uses with non-profit educational uses. See 
supra text accompanying notes 297-298. For example, photocopying a musical work in order 
that an entire school choir may sing it at a free performance is noncommercial and educational, 
and yet that use might completely supplant a significant market for the work, particularly if the 
work has been prepared with special emphasis on the youth choral market. 
I would not suggest redrawing the line in the first factor at commercial speech (rather 
than commercial use) because I think the "hardy" nature of commercial speech justifies the 
distinction. See supra note 66. Cf Tushnet, supra note 6, at 70-74. I would suggest placing 
commercial speech at one end of the spectrum in pursuit of another goal - to redirect courts 
away from overly-harsh conclusions on the basis of commercial, profit-oriented purposes for the 
second user' s expression/speech. My goal would simply be to introduce a more comprehensive 
balance of interests by introducing First Amendment principles. Within fair use, a balancing of 
various factors is already manifest - introducing a spectrum of commerciality would simply add 
to the mix without discounting the First Amendment's careful protection of all kinds of uses, 
including commerci al ones. Placing commercial speech at one end of the spectrum could be 
appealing to the judiciary in light of the Court's prior determination that some subordination of 
commercial speech is acceptable even within a wholly First-Amendment focused analysis. And 
creating a spectrum, versus the current false dichotomy, more appropriately focuses the courts 
on the wider range of interests implicated by the first factor, the purpose and character of a use. 
But if we pay attention to the rationale behind commercial speech doctrine, on the 
other hand, a difficulty with this proposal could arise. See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 
51 7 U.S. 484, 504 ( 1 996) (plurality opinion) (stating that speech prohibitions "serv[ing] an end 
unrelated consumer protection . . . .  rarely survive constitutional review"); City of C incinnati v. 
Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 4 1 0, 424 ( 1 993) (invalidating a ban on commercial 
newsracks when noncommercial newsracks were permitted, because the "categorical ban on 
commercial newsracks place[s] too much importance on the distinction between commercial and 
noncommercial speech [and because] in this case, the distinction bears no relat10nship 
whatsoever to the particular interests that the city has asserted. It is therefore an impermissible 
means of responding to the city's admittedly legitimate interests."); Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. 
Township of Willingboro, 43 1 U.S. 85, 96 ( 1 977) (allowing the government less leeway m 
regulating commercial speech when its restrictions do not take aim at the "commercial aspect o f  
[the speech] - with offerors communicating offers t o  offerees."). Without evidence that uses m 
"commercial speech" are more harmful to the copyright owner, i.e., less fair, than uses m 
noncommercial speech (including noncommercial speech distributed for a profit), and without a 
tie to the transactional aspect to commercial speech, the use of a commercial speech d1stmct1on 
within fair use could be invalid. It is difficult to argue that use of a copynghted work m 
advertising material is general ly  (categorically, without analysis of the particular use) more 
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applied. If the explicit commerci al/nonprofit element o f  the first 
factor were eliminated, courts could then feel  freer to focus on other 
elements of the purpose and character of a use and leave pro fiteering 
(via profit usurpation) for the fourth factor. 3 1 9  
The fair use analysis grew from case law dealing al most 
exclusively with defendants who had made commercial use o f  the 
work, and the addition of the language related to commerc ial use 
appears to have been a last-minute pal liative for the educational 
lobby. As such, its i nclusion should never have been given signi ficant 
emphasis by the courts. The courts'  fai lure to engage in a real 
evaluation of the meaning of commercial ity and its re levance to the 
purpose and c haracter of a use disserves the individual, case-by-case 
balancing of interests that courts performed before the 1 976 Act and 
that Congress i ntended to continue after the Act. M oreover, 
comparing the commercial speech/core speech line in First 
Amendment j urisprudence with the commercial use/noncommercial 
use line in copyright fair use demonstrates a divergence within fair 
use from F irst Amendment principles. Such a divergence is 
unacceptabl e  i n  l ight of the Court 's  emphasis on fair use as a 
protector of free speech interests. Eliminating commercial ity from the 
first fair use factor wil l  help minimize the conflict between the fair 
use analysis and First Amendment j urisprudence. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The Court relies on fair use as one of the primary internal 
safeguards for the freedom of speech within copyright, al though it has 
hannful to protected interests of a copyright owner than the use of that same work in a book. 
movie, educational text, etc. So although the distinction itself would not be controversial ,  in that 
it mirrors an accepted distinction within First Amendment jurisprudence, there is weak. i f  not 
nonexistent, theoretical support for discriminating within fair use on the basis that a use occurs 
in commerc
_
ial speech. As such, the Court's statement in Campbell that "[t]he use, for example. 
?f a copynghted work to advertise a product, even in a parody, will be entitled to less 
mdu��ence under the first factor of the fair use enquiry than the sale of a parody for its own 
sake also seems suspect, at best, under the Court's own commercial speech jurisprudence. 
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 585 ( 1994). Accord Tushnet, supra note 6, 
at 70-74. 
319 .
. . 
I prefer elimination of the first-factor consideration of commercial use over 
redefinition of commercial use as commercial speech for multiple reasons. Some of those 
reasons rela�e to the mo�em treatment of commercial speech, see supra note 318, and others 
relate to the mtemal considerations within fair use. Avoiding the skewing of the fair use analysis 
by weighing profitable uses in both the first and fourth fair use factors would create a more 
n�an
.
ced
_ 
analysis of fair use. See supra text accompanying notes 31 3-3 15. In addition, the 
ehmmal!on of con:mercial use from the first factor would bring current doctrine closer to the 
broad, open balancmg accommodated in the pre- l 976 model of fair use. 
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not explained its reliance. There is no evidence o f  a First Amendment 
purpose or structure to the doctrine, and l i ttle case law supports the 
Court's position. Courts rarely consider fair use defenses i nvested 
with significant free speech interests. G i ven the direct conflict 
between copyright and the First Amendment and the strong publ ic  
benefit underly ing each, we cannot com pletely resolve the di fficulty 
presented by such cases. No accommodation to copyright fair use can 
be certain to always rescue a free speech interest from a claim of 
copyright infringement. The Court could admit the lack of a real 
connection between fair use and free speech and provide separate 
First Amendment review in appropriate cases.  Or, if the Court 
continues to rely on fair use as a bulwark against separate F irst 
Amendment scrutiny of copyright, then the Court and Congress owe a 
duty to the First Amendment to make fair use and its analytical 
framework operate in accord with First Amendment principles rather 
than in discord. If we do not provide separate First Amendment 
review or reform fair use to encourage courts to consider a broad 
range of public benefits and private purposes within the balance of the 
first factor, we will  do a great disservice to the Constitution and future 
litigants. 
